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Abstract 
 
The historiography of President Franklin Roosevelt’s fireside chats, up until this 
point, have focused on FDR’s ability to radiate confidence via these captivating 
and extremely popular radio addresses.  When examined more closely, a clear 
outline of the New Deal takes shape, suggesting FDR’s true intentions behind the 
fireside chats: to educate the public of the administration’s legislative endeavors.  
Roosevelt’s second fireside chat, delivered on May 7, 1933, provides a vision for 
how the New Deal would correct the agricultural and industrial ills of the Great 
Depression and, in turn, revitalize the United States.  In order to connect the 
fireside chat with Roosevelt’s legislative agenda, documents from key advisors 
and Roosevelt himself are considered in connection with the creation of the 
second fireside chat.  More importantly, a collection of letters written to FDR in 
reaction to this specific fireside address are examined, exposing a passionate 
public response to the New Deal.  
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I am eleven years old and go to public school and expect to graduate next year.  
Last night I was very anxious to listen to our President, Mr. Roosevelt, in his 
radio talk.  But my regular bedtime is 9 o’clock and I was so sleepy I just couldn’t 
say up until almost 11 o’clock to listen. 
 
- Seymour Rubin, May 8, 19331 
 
 So often the youth of America represents, with incredible grace and 
simplicity, the theme of a nation in crisis.  This note, the first section of a letter to 
the New York Times, represented optimism, hope, and excitement encapsulated 
within just a few lines, but also the innocence of youth that was quickly 
disappearing in America.  When Franklin D. Roosevelt arrived in Washington, 
bleak would not describe the situation vividly enough.  David Kennedy’s 
Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, paints a 
harrowing comparison of America in 1929 with the situation FDR inherited as he 
delivered his inaugural address.  By 1933, seven billion dollars of account 
deposits were wiped out due to bank failure.  Over that time, one-third as many 
automobiles were produced in American factories, and the income of American 
farmers sank from six billion dollars to almost two billion.  Most of all, 1933 
brought a devastating 25 percent unemployment rate–Americans were cold, 
starving, and desperate.2  Roosevelt arrived in Washington as a stark contrast to 
this situation–a shining symbol of hope riding the musical coattails of “Happy 
Days are Here Again” and insisting from the first day of his presidency that fear 
                                                 
1 Seymour Rubin, letter to the editor, New York Times, May 10, 1933. 
2 David Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 163-165. 
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was America’s greatest problem.3 The mystique of an American savior grew 
quickly. 
 Roosevelt’s radio presence added to this aura.  His first fireside chat, 
delivered on March 12, 1933, barely a week after his inauguration, connected the 
president’s voice and personality with the public’s renewed hope for recovery.  
Samuel Rosenman, frequently a speechwriter for Roosevelt, went as far to suggest 
that FDR’s first year in office, radio deliveries included, completely eliminated 
the paralyzing fear rampant across the country on inauguration day.4  
Contemporary and historiographical analysis of Roosevelt’s fireside chats tell the 
same story–gentle rhetoric, conversational tone, and a famed radio presence 
equipped Roosevelt with the weapon of increased confidence to fight the 
depression.  Robert Swallow Fine’s Roosevelt’s Radio Chatting: Its Development 
and Impact during the Great Depression, an early study of the chats, argues that 
Roosevelt “establish[ed] a presidential monopoly over the major electronic 
medium of his time.” A study of how Roosevelt employed the medium during his 
presidency, Fine employs the fireside chat as a vehicle to explain “the first 
professional use of radio by an American president.” 5   While Fine’s dissertation 
does provide some timely analysis of Roosevelt’s concern for public opinion and 
the president’s perspective on radio in general, Roosevelt’s Radio Chatting is still 
                                                 
3 Jean Edward Smith, FDR (New York: Random House, 2008), 268-269. 
4 Samuel I. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), 96. 
5 Robert Fine Swallow, “Roosevelt’s Radio Chatting: Its Development and Impact during the 
Great Depression (PhD diss., New York University, 1977), iv-v. 
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only a cursory examination of the conversations Roosevelt held with the public, 
rather than a critical examination of their content or significance to the 
administration overall. 
 When looking at the fireside chats in a more specific manner, historians 
have pointed to the first of these addresses, delivered on March 12, as the 
strongest sampling of the president’s radio use in creating a fundamental 
connection between the “people and the president.”6  Several authors have upheld 
the historical significance of the first fireside address for its rhetorical ability to 
improve American confidence during the Great Depression, best represented by 
communications scholar Amos Kiewe’s FDR’s First Fireside Chat: Public 
Confidence and the Banking Crisis.  Kiewe’s observation of the first chat as “an 
intersection between rhetoric and economics” is on the mark, as he discusses the 
address with regards to its language, tone, and rhetorical mechanisms.7  
Rhetorically speaking, the analysis of FDR’s speeches frequently center on an 
effort to banish fear from the minds of the American people.  The metaphor of 
fear as a disease, one curable through the care of “Dr. Roosevelt,” became 
commonplace within New Deal rhetoric.  Kiewe also identifies a second metaphor 
which portrays fear as a “phantom”–an intangible feeling that logic cannot always 
                                                 
6 The phrase “people and the president” is a key conceptual phrase of Lawrence and Cornelia 
Levine’s study of letter writing and the fireside chats entitled The People and the President: 
America’s Conversation with FDR (Boston: Beacon Hill Press, 2002).  This study does an 
excellent job providing a glimpse into the potential responses by the American public to each of 
the chats, but does not tease out Roosevelt’s legislative agenda. 
7 Amos Kiewe, FDR’s First Fireside Chat: Public Confidence and the Banking Crisis (College 
Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2007), 15. 
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explain, and thus should not concern the American people.8  Kiewe’s observations 
provide a general summation of how positive rhetoric has explained the chat’s 
success: “confidence was the operative word for the duration of the banking 
crisis, and confidence was the rhetorical currency necessary for resuming a 
normal and stable banking industry.”9 
 Another communications scholar, David Ryfe, takes a broader focus.  Ryfe 
examines the rhetorical qualities of the chats in “Franklin Roosevelt and the 
Fireside Chats,” asserting how these qualities helped shape the addresses into a 
set of the most profound media events of the twentieth century.  Ryfe argues that 
the strong rhetorical quality of the chats allowed audiences to “live the drama” of 
their situation during the Great Depression.  According to Ryfe, Roosevelt used 
anecdotal stories to help listeners easily envision themselves in the situation the 
president painted.10  Furthermore, Ryfe argues that FDR adopted multiple roles 
throughout the chats, from the audience’s friend, to “counsel” for the American 
people, and even further as spokesperson for the legislative programs of the New 
Deal.11  Those roles became even more believable when studying the vocabulary 
Roosevelt used; personal pronouns such as “you” and “we” became central to 
Roosevelt’s speeches.12  While Ryfe focuses on the rhetorical elements of the 
chat, his work, albeit indirectly, identifies a connection between Roosevelt’s 
                                                 
8 Kiewe, 91-92. 
9 Ibid., 96. 
10 David Ryfe, “Franklin Roosevelt and the Fireside Chats,” Journal of Communication 49, no 4 
(1990): 95. 
11 Ryfe, “Franklin Roosevelt,” 94. 
12 Ibid., 92-93. 
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speeches and his legislative agenda.  Arguing that audiences “linked themselves 
in an intimate fashion to government recovery efforts,” Ryfe suggests that 
rhetorical techniques would “tie New Deal policies to Roosevelt’s personal 
veracity.”13  From Robert Fine’s general account of Roosevelt’s radio delivery to 
Kiewe and Ryfe’s more modern analysis on tone, language, and the targeted goal 
of restoring confidence, a strong argument can be made for President Roosevelt’s 
use of the fireside chats as model of success. 
 Let us, however, return to Seymour Rubin, the passionate grammar school 
student.  On the surface, as historians and communication experts past and present 
have argued, the legendary voice of Franklin Roosevelt was the motivating factor 
for listening in.  When the rest of the letter is considered however, Roosevelt’s 
performance and technique is only part of the story: 
Couldn’t the president speak at an earlier hour so that the children who will 
be grown up citizens some day could listen to him?  I do so much wish I 
could hear his own live voice explain what he is doing in these trying 
times.  Or maybe if he can’t make all of his speeches earlier–because I 
know he must be awfully busy–don’t you think he could make just one 
speech even around 6 o’clock for the children?  I would be very happy if 
Mr. Roosevelt could talk when I could hear him.14 
 
For Seymour, the fireside chat also represented a learning curve–the ability to 
discover what FDR had planned, how these plans would unfold, and where 
individual citizens would fit into the rebirth of American society.  Here, Seymour 
                                                 
13 Ryfe, “Franklin Roosevelt,” 94-95. 
14 Seymour Rubin, letter to the editor, New York Times, May 10, 1933. 
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Rubin saw these radio addresses as an avenue for civic education–a window into 
the mind that would solve the Great Depression. 
Several of Roosevelt’s closest advisors recount the chats’ influence on 
achieving legislative goals.  Samuel Rosenman, political advisor and 
speechwriter, addressed in his memoir, Working with Roosevelt, the use of the 
radio as a weapon for legislative programs while Roosevelt was governor of New 
York–issuing proposals that would force the hand of the state legislature by 
generating pronounced support from the public.15  Raymond Moley, one of FDR’s 
closest advisors during the election and the administration’s first term, discussed 
the banking situation by reflecting upon the genesis of the plan for reform, not the 
construction of a rhetorical masterpiece that would sell the plan to the public.16  
Rexford Tugwell, later slated as assistant secretary of Agriculture, summed up the 
significance of the chats when reacting to a congressman’s comments: 
The house was burning down, he [Republican Burt Snell] said: let the 
president put out the fire.  The effect of the speech was magical; but no 
one knew better than Roosevelt that he had to produce more than 
reassurance.  The magic was temporary.17 
 
New Deal legislation would become not only the foundation of the 
administration’s policy, but also the backbone of the fireside chats.  
Scholarship has, to this point, assessed these speeches as almost 
exclusively bent on improving confidence, less than a delivery of an 
                                                 
15 Samuel I. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, 39. 
16 Raymond Moley, The First New Deal (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), 196. 
17 Rexford Tugwell, Roosevelt’s Revolution: The First Year, A Personal Perspective (New York: 
MacMillan, 1976), 64. 
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administration’s ideals.  Legendary New Deal experts James Macgregor Burns, 
Frank Freidel, and William Leuchtenburg, in constructing their landmark studies 
of the Roosevelt administration, mention the chats only in passing.  Each of these 
experts emphasize the rhetorical style of these speeches, celebrating the chat’s 
ability to raise confidence over the potential to promote the president’s program to 
Americans.  To be fair, their treatment of the chats often aligns with the purpose 
of the monographs themselves.  William Leuchtenburg’s Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and the New Deal, billed as the “best one-volume synthesis of the New Deal” by 
Freidel, mentions the chats only three times: once in connection to increasing 
bank deposits after the first chat, a sentence in passing regarding the June 1938 
chat on divisions within the Democratic party, and a short summary of 
Roosevelt’s brilliant rhetoric over the radio within the book’s conclusion.18   
Frank Freidel’s Franklin D. Roosevelt: Launching the New Deal discusses the 
chats six times, four of which connect to the second chat; the larger focus of this 
work.  When addressing the fight for the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(NIRA), Freidel’s work does allude to the bridge between the second chat and its 
impact on the impending legislation, albeit in passing: “Roosevelt had helped 
prepare the nation for it [NIRA] through trial balloons in the press and his address 
to the Chamber of Commerce and Fireside Chat.”19  While mentioning key 
                                                 
18 William Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (1963; repr., New York: 
Harper Perennial, 2009), 44, 330-331. 
19 Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Launching the New Deal, (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1973), 444.  Even when potentially connecting the Fireside Chat to the broader New 
Deal program, the Fireside Chat ranks behind newspaper coverage and a closed door session with 
the United States Chamber of Commerce. 
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legislative concepts such as government partnership and experimentation, 
Freidel’s account of the speeches continuously return to Roosevelt’s “warm, 
friendly explanation of what he was trying to achieve,” instead of placing the 
speeches in context of a rapidly developing New Deal program.20  James 
MacGregor Burns’ Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, is described by the author as 
a “political biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt” and a “study of political 
leadership in American Democracy.”21  Here, sound bites of the chats frame 
Roosevelt’s political aptitude in the radio arena–occasionally illustrating the 
fireside chat as a political weapon against dissention.  Burn’s best emphasis of the 
chat’s political nature can be seen in Roosevelt’s 1938 “Copperhead” address, the 
same chat mentioned by Leuchtenburg, emphasizing FDR’s counterattack against 
the advances of conservative Southern Democrats.  Burns depiction of 
Roosevelt’s aggressive tone over the radio, making clear the president’s distain 
for radicals within the party ranks, clearly connects with the rhetorical argument 
for the chat’s success.  Still, in a speech about political dissention, the source of 
conflict is a matter of legislation and the Democratic Party platform, 
demonstrating the recurring appearance of Roosevelt’s New Deal agenda within 
the chats.22 
                                                 
20 Freidel, 433-434, 437-438, 444. 
21 James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (1956; repr., New York: Konecky & 
Konecky, 1984), ix. 
22 Burns, 360-361. 
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It is important to emphasize the truth to Roosevelt’s legendary voice, 
addictive charm, and infectious confidence in the American people, especially 
when placed in the context with the arguments of these foundational works on the 
New Deal.  That being said, these works do address legislative goals first and 
foremost, and thus should be complemented by a broader use of the fireside chats.  
Leuchtenburg insists the purpose of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal is to 
trace “the devastation wrought by the depression and the remarkable 
improvisation of new political and social institutions to cope with it.”23  Many of 
the fireside chats, especially the second chat broadcasted on May 7, 1933, feature 
an introduction of such “social institutions” to the American people.  Freidel’s 
title, Launching the New Deal, suggests the importance of agenda and program to 
the story of Roosevelt’s presidency.  The opening pages of this monograph, in 
recounting FDR’s early political career, consistently return to FDR’s desire to 
help “the man at the foot of the ladder,” to quote Roosevelt himself. There is no 
better connection between destitute Americans and Roosevelt himself than the 
fireside chats, a description of reform from the president himself that generated a 
mountain of letters, many of which responded directly to the president’s ideas.  
Still, the fireside chats are peripheral parts of these monographs–used as short 
sound bites to trace the development of a program as opposed to emphasizing 
these speeches as an integral part of the program itself.   
                                                 
23 Leuchtenburg, xii-xiii. 
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To suggest the speeches only exude confidence because of a masterful 
voice sells these ground breaking addresses short.  Other historians have made the 
connection between the fireside addresses and Roosevelt’s agenda, such as David 
Kennedy’s artful comments in Freedom from Fear: 
Roosevelt had, in fact, been building up to that [second presidential] 
campaign for more than a year in a remarkable series of addresses, 
including several Fireside Chats broadcast nationally on the radio.  
Despite the frequently repeated accusation that the New Deal lacked a 
coherent philosophy and that Roosevelt had no capacity for ordered 
thought, those addresses taken together, etched at least the outlines of a 
structured and durable social philosophy that constituted the ideological 
heart of the New Deal.24 
 
Kennedy’s examination goes beyond the chat’s rhetoric, arguing that Roosevelt 
used the fireside chat to explain, support and even advance New Deal programs to 
the people nationwide.  It is a small difference from other New Deal histories, but 
a difference of paramount importance to understanding the fireside chats–
obviously these speeches could be used to tell the story of the New Deal, but to 
state that FDR used the chats to further New Deal programs is completely 
different.  This analysis is seldom found (if at all) in other narratives, and is used 
more frequently and effectively by Kennedy.  For example, when discussing the 
development of the National Recovery Administration (NRA), Kennedy cites the 
third chat of June 1933 as a key discussion of the Blue Eagle campaign for 
industrial compliance: 
Roosevelt declared that "those who cooperate in this program must know 
each other at a glance.  That is why we have provided a badge of honor for 
this purpose, a simple design with a legend, 'We do our part,' and I ask that 
                                                 
24 Kennedy, 244. 
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all those who join with me shall display the badge prominently…There are 
adequate penalties in the law.”25 
 
Kennedy’s use of the chats as Roosevelt’s sounding board for administration 
policies continues throughout the narrative, as illustrated here in the fifth chat, 
which discussed the Emergency Relief Appropriations Bill: “The need for relief 
would continue ‘for a long time to come,’ he [Roosevelt] added in his Fireside 
Chat of June 28, 1934.  ‘We may as well recognize that fact.’”26  While only a 
very small portion of the overall work, Freedom From Fear comes the closest to 
framing the fireside chats within the White House’s legislative agenda, employing 
snippets of the addresses as it beautifully outlines the New Deal and its impact on 
the American people.   
 Depression era histories, Freedom from Fear included, build from the 
tradition established by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. in the foundational series The Age 
of Roosevelt.  Kennedy’s use of the fireside chats, in this way, is no different.  
Schlesinger’s second volume in the series, The Coming of the New Deal, 
addresses all six of the first fireside chats, often concentrating on the chats content 
and connection to New Deal programs.  Like most other New Deal historians, 
Schlesinger does use the first fireside chat to discuss the use of plain language, the 
restoration of confidence, and the role Roosevelt’s expression had on saving the 
banking system.27  However, The Coming of the New Deal seldom returns to 
                                                 
25 Kennedy, 184. 
26 Ibid., 250. 
27 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1959), 12-13. 
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descriptions of rhetoric moving forward.  One example is Schlesinger’s use of the 
third fireside chat of June 1933, a speech that announced Roosevelt’s approval of 
NRA “blanket agreements” that set up industrial controls nationwide.28  Towards 
the end of the work, Schlesinger emphasizes Roosevelt’s use of the fifth and sixth 
fireside chats to defend the accomplishments of the New Deal.  This can be seen 
specifically within Schlesinger’s treatment of Roosevelt’s fifth chat in June 1934, 
leading up to formation of a Democratic platform for the upcoming election: 
Roosevelt’s fireside chat in late June had set the keynote for the 
democratic campaign.  "The simplest way for each of you to judge 
recovery," he said "lies in the plain facts of your individual situation.  Are 
you better off than you were last year?  Are your debts less burdensome?  
Is your bank account more secure?  Are your working conditions better?  
Is your faith in your own individual future more firmly grounded?"29 
 
As with Kennedy, Schlesinger’s work connects to the idea that Roosevelt used the 
chats as a way to broadcast decisions and priorities of the administration, but 
lacks the detail to fully explore the chat’s potential to forward the president’s 
agenda.  In this way, FDR’s outline of his legislative agenda for the public–
packaged within the fireside chat and delivered to the American people via the 
radio–remains elusive within the historiography of the New Deal.  
 Thus, it is paramount to change lenses when looking at these speeches.  
While secondary and primary literature abound with references to Roosevelt’s 
tone and rhetorical strength when delivering the fireside chats, few focus on the 
content of these addresses, and not one broadly considers the chats as an 
                                                 
28 Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal, 114. 
29 Ibid., 503. 
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introduction of the New Deal to the American people.  A detailed study of the 
connection between the legislative agenda of the Roosevelt White House and the 
desperate American people via the fireside chats is warranted: a study that 
examines each of the chats’ place in the New Deal program as it unfolded over 
the course of the Great Depression.  Many of the president’s advisors, while 
commenting on the importance of Roosevelt’s tone and speaking ability to radiate 
confidence, also underscore the importance of legislative content in discussion of 
the New Deal.  The legendary voice of the president echoes throughout media 
studies because of his tone and clarity, but it is equally important to examine the 
content of these addresses in connection to their groundbreaking delivery: a 
delivery of policy that would frame FDR’s New Deal to the public.   Historians, 
particularly Schlesinger and Kennedy, have suggested the connection between 
program and these public addresses, but do not deliver an analysis solidifying the 
chats within the overall mission that became Roosevelt’s New Deal program.  
This is not to discount the importance of Roosevelt’s mastery of the spoken word 
via the radio, or its magical ability to induce confidence.  FDR’s radio presence 
was not limited to the creation of optimistic presentations for a downtrodden 
people, but was also the language of the New Deal defined by advisors, 
speechwriters, and the president himself.  Certainly Roosevelt sought to evoke a 
sense of strength, security, and above all, confidence at a time that saw misery, 
fear, and destitution.  However, Roosevelt used those speeches not simply as an 
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elixir to revitalize the American spirit, but more importantly as a blueprint 
designing a new era for a people desperate for answers.   
The fireside chats, when examined as speeches designed primarily to bring 
the president’s program to life within the homes of the American people, take a 
position of newfound importance within the legacy of the New Deal program.  
When viewed as a portfolio of FDR’s legislative agenda, the fireside chats add to 
the historiography of the New Deal, creating a more complete picture of the 
legislative priorities of the Roosevelt Administration. In this way, two essential 
steps must be taken to convey FDR’s educational intentions within the fireside 
addresses.  First, it is critical to trace the themes of change in American industry, 
agriculture, and other key areas of reform dominant within FDR’s program, and 
connect these themes to content delivered by the chats.  Only here can the 
fundamental ideas that shaped New Deal policy, typically hidden behind 
Roosevelt’s artful use of rhetoric, come to life.  Secondly, a detailed look into the 
public’s response to these speeches is warranted, not in search of confirmation for 
Roosevelt’s mastery of the radio, but their evaluation, for better or for worse, of 
the New Deal program.  The March 12 fireside chat, although the first and 
perhaps most memorialized, does not seek to communicate the ideas of the New 
Deal, but instead to explain a bank holiday crafted by outgoing Hoover officials 
as much as the incoming Roosevelt administration.  The speech of May 7, FDR’s 
second fireside chat, transmits the policy of Roosevelt’s New Deal: solidifying a 
message crafted first and foremost to instruct the American people of changes that 
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would defeat the “emergency.”  Serving as an example for the remainder of the 
New Deal era, Roosevelt’s second fireside chat provided a vision of what the first 
hundred days and beyond would look like–speeches carefully crafted to 
conceptualize for listeners the administration’s goals in fighting the war on the 
Great Depression. 
 
Blueprint for Recovery – May 7, 1933 
 The May 7 address serves as the best example of how the fireside chats of 
Franklin Roosevelt’s first two terms broadcasted the president’s legislative 
agenda to the American people.  In the midst of the famed hundred days, the 
fireside chat is built in a sequence of five sections to reflect legislative priorities 
of the administration, crafted to combat the Great Depression.30  As if he were the 
professor at the front of a classroom, Roosevelt first returned to the subject of his 
first address, providing an overview of a country “dying by inches” from financial 
disasters, foreclosures, and the stoppage of banking operations across America.  
Here, Roosevelt suggested that his administration had a choice–allow the country 
to straighten itself out, or take action.  The second section of his speech insisted 
that his administration could not stand by and watch America suffer through the 
current situation, and thus the New Deal was born.  After ensuring the American 
people that the power of Congress had not been compromised, FDR identified the 
                                                 
30 Segmentation of the speech is a result of research and culminating construction of this work–
although newspapers typically reported on the speech in sections such as this, there was no 
enumeration by FDR in presenting the speech itself. 
  
 
17 
 
first, and perhaps most scrutinized, group of New Deal agencies.  Roosevelt 
mentioned by name the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), alluded to the 
creation of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) from the Farm Bill 
in Congress, outlined plans for the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), and National Industrial Recovery Act, 
and finally provided for bills in railroad development and the repeal of 
Prohibition.  Third, Franklin Roosevelt identified what his administration saw as 
the key problem prolonging the Depression: surplus. Here Roosevelt discussed 
not only the failing market structure of American agriculture, which had forced 
famers to sell their products at “prices ruinously low,” but also the similar fate of 
American industrial sectors: businesses that produced a surplus far beyond the 
possibility for consumption by Americans or abroad.  The accentuation of surplus 
transitioned naturally into the speech’s fourth section: government partnership.  
This idea not only dominated newspaper headlines across America, but also 
shaped the progression of the New Deal.  The fifth and final section of the speech 
discussed the president’s decision to abandon the gold standard, and explained 
how his administration sought to prevent the “flight” of gold from the country. 31  
As always, Roosevelt concluded the speech by thanking the American people for 
their support and the broadcasting companies for hosting the communication.  In 
                                                 
31 Franklin Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, May 7, 1933.  Franklin Delano Roosevelt Speech Collection.  
Coral Springs, Florida: The Historical Archive, [CD-ROM], 2007.  Russell Buhite and David 
Levy, FDR’s Fireside Chats (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 11-17.  The analysis of the chat 
itself was completed at first using an audio recording of the speech, supplemented via the use of 
the Buhite and Levy transcription.   
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this speech, less than twenty minutes in length, Roosevelt outlined an array of 
government programs to combat the Depression, exposed the roots of the Great 
Depression from surplus production, provided for a revolutionary connection 
between the government and the people, and extended the government’s control 
over the monetary machinery at the heart of the economic debacle.  The 
scaffolding for the New Deal was complete: a frame of ideas that represented the 
coalescence of Roosevelt’s personal ideology with the president’s Brains Trust, 
producing a vision that the American people could believe in and an education 
about how their government would remake the United States. 
 
Agricultural Theory 
 How do we ascertain the thoughts of a newly elected Franklin Roosevelt?  
The simple answer might be campaign speeches, but in this case, there is a more 
sophisticated possibility.  Looking Forward, a collection of Roosevelt’s campaign 
speeches edited and published as essays, recounts not only the candidate’s take on 
the issues that surrounded the campaign, but represent a handpicked selection of 
content that best represents the platform of the incoming president.  Published by 
the John Day Company in March 1933 as a “presentation of his theories of 
government and the broader phases of his policies,” Looking Forward was, 
according to the New York Times, put into motion by publishing consultant 
Richard Walsh.  After receiving a request from Walsh to develop a book, 
Roosevelt replied with “a pile of material 18 inches high” that might be 
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considered for publication.  Walsh’s review of the material resulted in an outline 
designed to advise the president-elect, and from there Roosevelt assembled the 
book personally.32  Reviewed in the Times on March 19, 1933, Looking Forward 
is praised not only as an introduction to the major areas of reform targeted by the 
New Deal, but as an “outline for the New Deal” itself: 
As President Roosevelt takes up the task of translating into terms of action 
his conception of the "new deal" there comes from the press this book in 
which he sets forth his convictions as to why a new deal is necessary and 
as to the character it must assume.  In piecemeal form the book's contents 
are already known to the public, for it is compiled from articles and 
speeches which millions have listened to or read.  Assembled between 
covers, and welded together by the instruction of connective material, 
these separate parts achieve a unity which enables the reader to obtain a 
comprehensive view of the bases on which the president plans to build his 
administration.33 
 
Looking Forward achieved broad distribution almost immediately, and stood at 
the top of the New York Times “Best Seller” list for non-fiction the week after its 
publication.  The book remained a top-selling work in non-fiction for another 
three months in at least one metropolitan city across the country, and would be 
accessible to Americans across the country–the very audience FDR looked to 
reach during the fireside chats.34  In conjunction with these speeches turned essay, 
                                                 
32 “Book Notes,” New York Times, November 11, 1932 and “Roosevelt Pamphlet Grows,” New 
York Times, March 16, 1933. 
33 “An Outline For the “New Deal:” In “Looking Forward” President Roosevelt States His 
Objectives,” New York Times, March 19, 1933. 
34 The publication success of Looking Forward is traced through the “Best Seller” list, also called 
“Best Sellers Here and Elsewhere,” published weekly within the New York Times.  The list 
provided the top three fiction and non-fiction texts that sold in several major metropolitan cities 
that week, often including cities from both coasts.  Looking Forward, after debuting in the top spot 
for non-fiction in New York, Washington, and Philadelphia, remained as a top three seller in at 
least one metropolitan city until June 19, 1933.   
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Roosevelt’s famed Brains Trust should be considered, which provide a bottomless 
dialogue directly connected to the construction and pursuit of the New Deal’s 
legislative agenda.  In this way, Looking Forward, in combination to the papers 
and memoirs of the first New Deal advisors, constructs a viable summation of a 
solid legislative agenda, a program flying in the face of suspicion that Roosevelt 
had no plan whatsoever.  It is this plan that evolves as the heart of the fireside 
chats, enveloping dialogue with the ideas of slashing surplus crop production, 
local cooperation with government initiatives and the support of struggling 
farmers. 
 Agriculture was, throughout the depression era, a major concern for FDR.  
In a letter dated March of 1932, New York governor Franklin Roosevelt 
responded to an angered Midwesterner accusing eastern seaboard planters of 
“strangling the western farmer” via market interactions.  In reply, Roosevelt 
included two strategies tested successfully in New York that might be 
implemented at the national level.  Roosevelt proposed that the government buy 
up unused farm land for conservation purposes and employ soil and crop studies 
“to aid farmers in balancing the[ir] production to suit market demands.”35  In 
short, Roosevelt’s proposed strategy attacked the rising levels of surplus crops 
flooding the American market.  This was markedly different from traditional 
agricultural reform, especially those strategies tested in the 1920s, which rested 
                                                 
35 FDR to G.W. Avery, March 9, 1932; Folder: FDR and Agriculture - January 1911 - March 
1933; FDR and Agriculture Collection; Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt; Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Library, Hyde Park, New York, hereafter cited as Agriculture Collection, FDR Library. 
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on currency reform and inflationary policy.36  According to Arthur Schlesinger 
Jr., what FDR and his Brains Trust proposed was less a specific course of action 
and more a general strategy–the creation, among other things, of “domestic 
allotment plans” that would directly attack surplus in agriculture.37  This policy 
took shape in a campaign speech delivered in Topeka, Kansas–an address that 
was later reworked for Looking Forward entitled “What About Agriculture?” 38 
“What About Agriculture” makes clear Roosevelt’s plan to dramatically 
reform the surplus side of American agriculture. The growth of farm surplus not 
only created an ongoing agricultural slump nationwide, but tremendously reduced 
the purchasing power of fifty million farmers.  The solution to these general 
problems focused on balancing “what the farmer sells and the things the farmer 
buys,” something Roosevelt insisted had not been attempted by 1933.39  To a 
certain extent this was true–domestic allotment plans were a far cry from the 
                                                 
36 Roosevelt’s agricultural policy, from the beginning, featured a variety of alterations to 
contemporary farm operation, the largest of which became controlled production of crops and 
livestock.  Controlling production via market exchange, both domestic and international, became a 
staple among supporters of the McNary-Haugen Bill during the 1920s.  In fact, the farm bill 
passed during the hundred days would eventually include tools to adjust production and the entry 
of agricultural products into the market.  See Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal, 39. 
37 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), 
424, 452 and The Coming of the New Deal, 36-39.  
38 “What about Agriculture?” is exclusively based on a critical campaign speech in Topeka Kansas 
from September, 1932, Franklin Roosevelt, Looking Forward (1933; reprint, New York: The John 
Day Company, 1953).  A good example of what contemporary and historiographical experts refer 
to as “ghostwriting,” this speech illustrates how Roosevelt’s campaign and presidential speeches 
were assembled.  According to Arthur Schlesinger in The Crisis of the Old Order, “many hands 
contributed to the final text.”  Schlesinger’s account identifies eight in all (423-424).   “What 
About Agriculture” is an early example of how Roosevelt assimilated multiple viewpoints and, in 
taking these ideas and snippets of writing, how he implemented them into a draft that became his 
own.  For an intensive look into ghostwriting in the Roosevelt White House, see Samuel 
Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, 1-12 and Robert Schlesinger, White House Ghosts: 
Presidents and Their Speechwriters, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 5-30. 
39 Roosevelt, “What About Agriculture,” Looking Forward, 132. 
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traditional currency reform sought by Midwestern agricultural lobbyists and 
international market reform pushed by supporters of the McNary-Haugen bills.  
“What About Agriculture” accounted for the surplus debacle in two ways: a 
drastic misunderstanding of the problem by previous administrations and 
declining consumption of products abroad.  Roosevelt’s plan aggressively 
attacked the “planned use of land” by farmers across the country, and proposed a 
reorganization of the Department of Agriculture that would provide alternatives to 
the repeated production of surplus crops. This government plan sought to employ 
tariffs, identify effective ways to negotiate pricing in foreign markets, and work 
with local administrations to deal with the problem.  Such statements catered to 
traditionalists still hung up on oversees dumping of agricultural product.  The 
heart of the plan, however, was to sure up the relationship between federal 
agencies and existing local cooperatives to help farmers deal with surplus via 
controlled production.  Roosevelt stressed that new measures must be completely 
voluntary: local networks between farmers and government agencies were of 
paramount importance, but could not force famers into cooperation.40 Such a plan, 
envisioned before FDR’s inauguration, sketched the frames of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration, and, in turn, Roosevelt’s second fireside chat. 
 During the administration’s first hundred days, few were closer to 
Roosevelt than Raymond Moley and Rexford Tugwell, and they knew it.  
According to Rexford Tugwell, assistant secretary of agriculture, “Ray was, for 
                                                 
40 Roosevelt, “What About Agriculture,” Looking Forward, 134-135. 
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all practical purposes, a cabinet member in one person; and I was his second.  
There was no real third.”41  Such influence in the early New Deal has made 
Moley’s analysis of those early days somewhat cavalier, but his observations 
remain paramount to almost every legislative endeavor of the first hundred days, 
agriculture included.  Moley mirrors Roosevelt’s observations in Looking 
Forward–critical of a “cycle of futility” in agricultural reform.  Moley takes it one 
step further, linking Roosevelt’s campaign promises to end surplus crop 
production with the promise to “raise the relative value of farmer’s income.”42  
The administration evaluated plans for agricultural reform from several different 
academic circles, but eventually settled on one designed by Tugwell and Henry 
Wallace, FDR’s secretary of Agriculture.  This plan proved remarkably similar to 
ideas outlined in Looking Forward, emphasizing the control of surplus, the 
development of local agencies to administer change, and to secure voluntary 
cooperation from farmers.43  In discussing the final version of the Farm Bill as it 
took shape, Moley suggested that it contained “something for everybody.”  Moley 
labeled the bill a “domestic allotment plan,” a term quickly becoming absorbed 
into New Deal terminology.  Such a plan, introduced at Topeka and dominant in 
Looking Forward, would reward farmers for voluntarily producing less of a 
particular crop.44  Moley’s recollection of agricultural reform refers to several 
                                                 
41 Moley, The First New Deal, 238. 
42 Ibid., 244-245. 
43 Ibid., 250-252. 
44 Ibid., 256. 
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aspects of the farm bill’s development, and is an invaluable resource on the 
hundred days.  Most of all, Moley narrates effectively the role surplus played in 
Roosevelt’s line of thinking and ultimately the legislative agenda portrayed by the 
fireside chat. 
  Rexford Tugwell’s account of early agricultural reform, which traced the 
complexities of shaping Roosevelt’s ideas behind the scenes in the Department of 
Agriculture, also focused on dealing with farm surplus.  Referring to the Farm 
Bill throughout its development as “unique” from previous reforms, Tugwell 
mirrors Moley’s emphasis of government efforts: agricultural administrators 
would employ local channels to coax land out of production and, in turn, decrease 
surplus through a variety of different actions and agreements.45  Such focus on 
surplus was not only dominant in the minds of FDR, Moley, Wallace and 
Tugwell, it quickly became Department of Agriculture policy as well.  The 
headline story of The Official Record of the United States Department of 
Agriculture released in April of 1933 reports just that: “Production Must Fit 
Actual, Not Desired, Markets, Says Tugwell.”  Here, Tugwell argues that farming 
trends must fit the “country’s needs,” and produce to a market that actually exists, 
thus addressing the elements of overproduction that destroyed farmer’s income 
and price points.46  Such points were not only made clear via this departmental 
                                                 
45 Rexford Tugwell, Unpublished Diary Entry; Folder: “The Hundred Days”; Diary: 1932 - May 
1933; Rexford Papers of Rexford Tugwell; Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, 
hereafter cited as Rexford Tugwell Papers, FDR Library. 
46 Rexford Tugwell, “Production Must Fit Actual, No Desired, Markets, Says Tugwell;” Folder: 
The Official Record of the United States Department of Agriculture; Rexford Tugwell Papers, 
FDR Library. 
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newsletter, but over the radio to emphasize the idea, as Tugwell sat as a guest on 
the National Farm and Home Hour two weeks before the newsletter was 
published.47  Like Moley, surplus production remained a foundational issue of 
New Deal reform, as Tugwell recounted in Roosevelt’s Revolution: 
The immense surpluses were a problem neither he nor others could ignore.  
So, in spite of his reluctance, he listened to the arguments of those of us 
who felt that heroic–and perhaps costly–measures must be undertaken.  It 
was the first necessity, we insisted, for general recovery.  If farm people–
made up nearly half the population then, counting owners, tenants, 
sharecroppers, laborers and villagers–could not sell, they could not buy; 
and if they could not buy, no one need supply the goods and services they 
would like.  Thus, closed factories, unemployment, general paralysis!48 
 
In this way, despite Roosevelt’s reluctance to increase spending in the early years 
of the New Deal, the central issue of agricultural reform remained the problem of 
surplus, and “voluntary domestic allotment” plans that sought to reduce 
cultivation across America became the weapon of choice by most New Dealers.  
As this focus became the ideological basis for the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration (AAA), it in turn became a key focus of the fireside chat as well.49 
Tugwell’s recollections on agriculture also reference other areas of New 
Deal reform independent of the crusade against surplus.  One such idea dominant 
throughout Tugwell’s memoirs are the negotiations with regional power bases in 
agriculture during the formation of administration policy.  As suggested in 
Looking Forward, and recounted by Moley, Roosevelt placed a heavy emphasis 
                                                 
47 Rexford Tugwell, “Address for the Farm and Home Hour;” Folder: National Farm and Home 
Hour 3/21/33; Rexford Tugwell Papers, FDR Library. 
48 Tugwell, Roosevelt’s Revolution, 32. 
49 Ibid., 48. 
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on voluntary participation and local cooperation–an impossibility unless farmers 
saw the benefit of reform.  Thus, Secretary Wallace and Assistant Secretary 
Tugwell were charged with meeting agricultural leaders from across the nation, 
representing cooperatives, union organizations and colleges.50  Such a meeting 
represents FDR’s concern for public support at the local level, a key to success for 
the unborn AAA.  This idea resonates within the fireside chat alongside the 
crusade against surplus production. 
Henry Wallace was not considered an academic goliath or a part of the 
celebrated brain trust, but nonetheless had a hand in developing key policy 
measures. Wallace did not see the agricultural programs as temporary remedies 
for the Great Depression, but as the building blocks for a stronger agricultural 
community.  As early as March of 1933, Wallace pushed for a more permanent 
policy to help the destitute farmer.  Arguing that overproduced commodities could 
take three to four years to completely wash out of the glutinous market, Wallace 
insists that programs be semi-permanent, especially in the face of hostile 
European markets.  In addition, it would take at least that long for workers 
displaced from farms across America to find jobs in other recovering industries, 
and they must be supported in some way until unemployment was addressed more 
readily.51  By examining the contributions of key administration policy makers, 
                                                 
50 White House Press Release, March 11, 1933; Folder: FDR and Agriculture - January 1911 - 
March 1933; Agriculture Collection, FDR Library. 
51 Henry Wallace to Franklin Roosevelt, March 15, 1933; Folder: FDR and Agriculture - January 
1911 - March 1933; Agriculture Collection, FDR Library. 
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critical ideas brought to fruition by the Farm Bill–surplus control, locally driven 
reform, added support for impoverished farmers–all return to the original ideas of 
Looking Forward, in some cases as a verbatim list of qualifications for reform. 
These ideas, developed within the interworking of the Roosevelt administration, 
came to fruition as part of the Farm Bill and the AAA, and were delivered to the 
American people by Roosevelt via the second fireside chat. 
 With tremendous change, however, came public suspicion of autocratic 
domination from the White House. Realizing this, FDR included early on in the 
radio message a disclaimer regarding the growth of such power, insisting that 
Congress had not lost the power to legislate to the White House, but instead a 
“well grounded, well rounded plan” was being implemented throughout multiple 
branches of the United States government.  This plan, as it relates to agriculture 
and industry, specifically referenced agricultural efforts to reduce surplus and 
encourage local cooperation with federal programs–the same ideas put so plainly 
in Roosevelt’s Looking Forward as well as the papers and memoirs of key 
administrative staff.  In describing the Farm Bill, Roosevelt emphasizes the 
program that evolved into the AAA: 
The Farm Relief Bill seeks by the use of several methods, alone or 
together, to bring about an increased return to farmers for their major farm 
products, seeking at the same time to prevent in the days to come 
disastrous overproduction, the kind of overproduction that so often in the 
past has kept farm commodity prices far below a reasonable return.52 
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In broadcasting the importance of the Farm Bill, Roosevelt’s address made clear 
the connection between surplus production and falling agricultural income, an 
idea key to the Administration’s assessment of the agricultural problem.  
Roosevelt went on to thank the people for their support of programs that attack 
the root cause of the Great Depression–surplus production:   
I feel very certain that the people of this country understand and approve 
the broad purposes behind these new governmental policies relating to 
agriculture and industry and transportation.  We found ourselves left with 
more agricultural products than we could possibly consume ourselves and 
with surpluses which other nations did not have the cash to buy from us 
except at prices ruinously low.53 
 
This short but nonetheless key section of the speech affirms the administration’s 
concern for surplus production in America, and clearly connects Roosevelt’s 
legislative agenda to a radio speech designed to drum up support for a 
revolutionary agricultural program. 
 The Farm Bill was, however, one of the few acts covered intensely by the 
media leading up to the fireside chat.  That said, it is easy to become skeptical of 
the legislative significance of Roosevelt’s speech with regards to agriculture.  In 
addition, looking back on the hundred days, there is the question of Roosevelt’s 
sincerity–did he really need public support generated by a radio broadcast?  While 
possible to look back on the hundred days as being defined by a rubber stamp 
Congress, there is good reason to believe that no program was a sure bet.  
Raymond Moley, despite his highhanded recollection of the Administration as 
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fragmented and unplanned ideologically, rejects this claim, suggesting that the 
Seventy-Third Congress would not be “stampeded or cajoled.”54  When 
examining the press releases of the administration early on, there was a consistent 
call for the Farm Bill to be passed in time for the rapidly approaching growing 
season.55  In short, while emergency banking legislation sailed through, 
agricultural reform of this level, and other reform measures, would be opposed to 
some degree.  As an analysis of Roosevelt’s perspective on public opinion will 
demonstrate later in this work, the administration projected a tremendous value 
upon public support.  While impossible to ascertain the degree to which the 
fireside chat and interconnected public support had on passage of the farm bill a 
mere five days later, there was no better medium for the President to tap public 
motivation for the Farm Bill than by speaking directly to the American people.  In 
this way, the agricultural ideas of the early New Deal show through brilliantly via 
Roosevelt’s use of the radio. 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 Moley, The First New Deal, 234, 338.  It is critical to consistently compare Moley’s reflection 
upon the administration to other sources.  While Moley was indeed FDR’s strongest influence 
during the hundred days legislatively, and thus a figure of paramount importance, his resignation 
from the administration several years later embittered his perspective on much of what was 
accomplished. 
55 For the long path navigated by the Roosevelt Administration in pursuit of a Farm Bill, as well as 
the urgency to pass the bill before the approaching season, see the January 1911–March 1933 
folder of the FDR and Agriculture Collection and correspondence between Henry Wallace and 
FDR from the President’s Official File 1–The Department of Agriculture, both collections from 
the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. 
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Guiding the “Great Economic Machine” 
Unlike his progressive take on agriculture, Roosevelt’s vision for 
industrial reform had not taken shape into a comprehensive bill by the time radios 
were switched on for the fireside chat on May 7.  This, however, does not mean 
Roosevelt’s ideas were underdeveloped in writing, nor does it mean they were 
completely separated from agricultural policy.  FDR’s “Need For Economic 
Planning” essay in Looking Forward argues for a dramatic increase in 
government involvement, framing economic reform as a calculable endeavor 
achieved through measurement and planning: “our present condition can be 
expressed, in every industry and profession, by statistics, by charts, by graphic 
reports.  Our hopes for the future might be shown the same way.”56   In that essay, 
Roosevelt insists that American society needs assistance from the government in 
controlling surplus production in agriculture and industry, citing the need for 
programs to produce a better balanced economy.57  Throughout the Roosevelt 
campaign, reforming the operation of American business was a dominant theme, 
suggesting that American industrial leaders need to consider how change might 
help the country, a challenge to “think less about the producer and more about the 
consumer.”58  Because government intervention runs so very counter to the idea 
                                                 
56 “Need For Economic Planning” was based exclusively on a critical campaign speech at 
Oglethorpe University in Atlanta, Georgia in May, 1932.  See Roosevelt, Looking Forward, 39. 
57 Roosevelt, “Need for Economic Planning,” Looking Forward, 47.  
58 Ibid., 49. 
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of laissez faire competition infused throughout American economic theory since 
the nineteenth century, FDR links legislative reform with experimentation: 
The country needs, and unless I mistake its temper, the country demands 
bold, persistent experimentation.  It is common sense to take a method and 
try it; if it fails, admit it frankly and try another.  But above all, try 
something.  The millions who are in want will not stand by silently forever 
while the things to satisfy their needs are within easy reach.59 
 
Experimentation may be what was rewarding about the New Deal, and it is an 
important theme of Roosevelt’s program.  However, the overhaul of industry’s 
relationship with the government centered on a concern at the heart of New Deal 
reform: the control of surplus. 
 Hugh Johnson was at the center of this reform, taking control of the newly 
minted NRA in the months following the second fireside chat.  In turn, Johnson 
was exclusively connected to the development of industrial codes designed to 
revolutionize industry’s relationship with Washington.  The driving purpose 
behind many of these codes became, like agriculture, the control of surplus and 
new attention towards the condition of the workforce.  Both of these themes are 
evident in Johnson’s memoir, The Blue Eagle: From Egg to Earth, specifically an 
opening chapter describing the state of American industry during the Depression 
entitled “Balanced Economy v. Rugged Individualism.”  Here, Johnson argues 
that the “great economic machine had no governor,” which under normal 
circumstances aligned with the American laissez-faire model of industrial 
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progress.60  But, in an era when industrial progress had fallen apart, a new mantra 
was required, and “balance” was the answer according to Johnson: “Always the 
answer is balance–balance of supply to demand, balance of prices at fair 
exchanged parity throughout the whole economic structure, and balance of 
benefits among great economic areas.”61  Johnson attacked the problem of 
American industry in two very familiar areas: overproduction, leading to surplus 
material, and the condition of the workers, often lost within the great cogs of the 
American industrial machine.  As with agriculture, avoiding surplus production is 
also a dominant theme of industrial reform. According to Johnson, avoiding 
surplus called for the development of economic systems that will produce to 
demand, not the other way around–a critical aspect of creating a balanced 
economy.  In addition, Johnson suggested that balancing the profit margins of all 
the classes would certainly produce a positive effect on industry as a whole.  
Johnson is thinking here of the working class, suggesting that protection from 
wage driven poverty is critical; otherwise the fate of this class will produce a 
“downward drag” on the progress of an entire society.62  Both of these themes fit 
Roosevelt’s overall plan to create a working relationship between American 
industry and its government. 
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 As with agriculture, Raymond Moley and to a certain extent Rexford 
Tugwell both discussed industrial reform of the administration’s first year.  In The 
First New Deal, Moley makes clear his involvement with multiple parties in 
Washington that had their hand in industrial reform.63  In this vein, Moley adds to 
our understanding of industrial reform in two ways.  First, Moley recounts the 
influence of business leaders unafraid of supporting change to traditional 
industrial models.  Interaction with the business community brought another 
theme to the reform ideology–competition.  Moley recounts the role of “cutthroat 
competition” as a key symptom of a sickly American economy.  This was amid 
the belief, recounted earlier by Wallace and Tugwell, that the farm community 
could evolve into a healthy market for American industrial products, but like the 
labor market, would not be ready for at least a year following intense government 
reform.  Thus, cut-throat competition among industrial powers might destroy any 
progress in industry before it began.  Right in the middle of this process was 
Henry Harriman, president of the National Chamber of Commerce, who 
suggested “conferences” to develop agreements in economic planning in hopes 
that such competition might be checked.64  When examining the writing and 
recollections of key individuals connected to industrial reform at this stage of the 
New Deal, terms such as “cutthroat competition,” “living wage,” and most 
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definitely “overproduction” became synonymous with reform, emerging as an 
integral part of the fireside chat. 
 The highly touted “brains trust” certainly receives the most attention of all 
contributors to the early New Deal, but as G. William Domhoff and Michael 
Webber argue in Class and Power in the New Deal, influential groups outside of 
the administration played a vital role in forming several key New Deal programs.  
Domhoff and Weber’s work recount the influence of “corporate moderates” on 
the development of the NRA–industrialists who found encouragement in working 
hand in hand with the government in resolving the industrial crisis, and in some 
cases proposing changes to policy.65   At the very least, the influence of such 
individuals is felt in the development of the fireside chats.  Domhoff and Weber 
discuss plans for industrial cooperation developed by Harriman and Gerald Swope 
of General Electric, both of whom fit the ideological mold of the administration’s 
industrial policy.66  It is no secret that Roosevelt’s advisors supplemented the 
president’s already voracious reading of newspapers with separate clippings on 
specific issues.67  Buried deep within the President’s Personal File in Hyde Park, 
folders marked “speech material” provide some insight as to what type of 
                                                 
65 G. William Domhoff and Michael Webber, Class and Power in the New Deal: Corporate 
Moderates, Southern Democrats, and the Liberal-Labor Coalition (Stanford, California: Stanford 
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66 Domhoff and Webber, Class and Power in the New Deal, 107. 
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information FDR used when designing his speeches, including the fireside chats; 
records that abound with quotations from Harriman and Swope.  The folder 
contains frequent excerpts from the Washington Star recounting the record of the 
Chamber of Commerce, often led by Harriman, as quoted here on May 1, 1933:  
“The president is seeing in every way to assist industry.  Industry must bestir 
itself.  Up to the present, there has been cooperation on the part of the 
Government and not so much on the part of industry.”  The folder is dominated by 
references to the Chamber of Commerce, and to display the influence of Harriman 
and Swope, one memo quoted the Star’s summation of their collaboration: 
“Under their [Harriman and Swope’s] ideas, trade associations would submit 
programs or agreements to the government for industry control, price control, 
wage control in cooperation with labor, hours of labor and allocation of 
production among the units within industry.”68  Such notes serve as examples of 
information the president could have used when reviewing and redrafting his 
addresses, illustrating the influence of other power bases outside the 
administration.   
 The same folder also contained items dated much later than the first 
hundred days.  In one memo entitled “Development of the N.R.A.,” the unnamed 
author recounts the development of the NRA during the hundred days, further 
connecting the fireside chat specifically to the NRA: “On May [10], 1933, after 
                                                 
68 Folder: Business v. New Deal; Presidents Personal File 1820; Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt; 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY, hereafter cited as Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, 
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the President addressed the radio audience of America, it was realized for the first 
time by the public that some sort of regulatory legislation was planned.”69  Such 
an observation, although via reflection several years later, demonstrates that the 
May 7 fireside address is likely the very first time the American people were 
informed of such legislative plans.  In this way, not only are the ideas that evolved 
into the NRA present in the radio address, but this controversial New Deal 
administration might trace its announcement to the public back to the fireside chat 
in the first place. 
 The fireside chat, delivered before the passage of the NIRA, could not 
delve into the specifics of policy still being assembled by the administration 
leading up to May 7.  Even so, the radio speech was designed to inform America 
of the administration’s legislative agenda, not a bill in Congress.  The address 
frames the administration’s actions ideologically in connection with industry, as 
described by Roosevelt’s Looking Forward, Johnson and Moley’s memoirs, and 
                                                 
69 Folder: National Recovery Act; Presidents Personal File 1820; Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt; 
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even speech reference material.  This address zeroes in on surplus production and 
developing a balanced economy with (as opposed to against) agriculture: 
Well-considered and conservative measures will likewise be proposed, 
within a few days, that will attempt to give to the industrial workers of the 
country a more fair wage return, to prevent cutthroat competition, to 
prevent unduly long hours for labor, and at the same time to encourage 
each industry to prevent overproduction.70 
 
This section, following directly after Roosevelt accents the importance of the 
Farm Bill, not only links agriculture and industry together via the prevention of 
surplus, but also identifies other themes dominant within Moley and Johnson’s 
narrative of the hundred days: “cutthroat completion,” a more reasonable wage, 
and superior systems for scheduling of labor.  To be sure, the recognition of these 
issues became paramount for Johnson, soon to be named director of the NRA.  
Using the radio a month later on June 16, 1933, roughly a week before FDR’s 
third fireside chat, Johnson continued to include such ideas in his own speech, 
mirroring the second fireside chat when expanding upon the goals of the NRA: 
First, to carry out our primary purpose, which is to put men back to work 
at decent living wages in the shortest possible space and time, and second, 
those provisions which you [the industry] find it absolutely necessary to 
include to protect the willing and the forward-looking among your 
members from the racketeers and the price-cutters and those willing to 
take advantage of the unselfishness and public spirit of other men.71 
 
These ideas become the mantra of not only Johnson and the NRA, but also of the 
public’s support of the New Deal. 
                                                 
70 Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, May 7, 1933. 
71 Radio Address, Hugh Johnson; Folder: Radio Address, June 16, 1933; Hugh Johnson Papers; 
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 FDR wished to make clear in these addresses that while not liberal or 
reactionary, that these ideas were new, and that the administration would test such 
measures in order to best meet the “emergency.”72  Such transparency was a 
breath of fresh air for Americans, and produced several key quotations in 
connection to the spirit of experimentation from Roosevelt’s essay on government 
planning in Looking Forward: “I do not deny that we may make some mistakes of 
procedure as we carry out this policy [of government investment in industry].  I 
have no expectation of making a hit every time I come to bat.  What I seek is the 
highest possible batting average, not only for myself but the team.”73  While 
perhaps the most frequently quoted line from the chat, it also connected to the 
theme of experimentation made clear by Roosevelt in Looking Forward.  
Newspaper editors and public responses alike celebrated the baseball analogy to 
embolden the process of trial and error, including Will Rogers, whose timely 
“dispatch” to Americans selected the remark as one of three reasons to celebrate 
the president’s speech.74  While this quotation was certainly the talk of the nation, 
it paled in comparison to the boldfaced idea of the talk: government partnership. 
 
                                                 
72 FDR used “the emergency” in each of the first two fireside chats to refer to the Great 
Depression. 
73 Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, May 7, 1933. 
74 Will Rogers, “Will Rogers Dispatch,” Boston Globe, May 9, 1933.  Rogers’ commentary 
regarding the legislative content is hard to decipher.  On one hand, Rogers remarks on May 9 that 
Roosevelt “read the minutes of the last meeting” and “forgot to mention what might be in his mind 
for the future.”  This however, is not to say that Rogers missed the importance of FDR’s plans, as 
on May 10 he suggested that he would “lick any of ‘em” in Congress regarding the issues of the 
day.  While perhaps the mouthpiece of America, Rogers may just be writing what will get him the 
biggest reaction. 
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Engineering a Government Partnership 
 The May 7 fireside chat best encapsulates the administration’s vision for 
an agricultural and industrial partnership between the private sector and the 
federal government.  While a definitive break from laissez-faire ideology, it is an 
idea reflected within Roosevelt’s plan for economic reform.  As with industrial 
and agricultural policy, the idea of government partnership is present in 
Roosevelt’s introduction to Looking Forward, which makes plain FDR’s desire to 
prevent industrial and agricultural dysfunction through planning.  In addition, 
Roosevelt insists such planning would coincide with government intervention–
interaction that should continue far past the conclusion of the “emergency:” 
I shall not speak of an economic life completely planned and regulated.  
That is as impossible as it is undesirable.  I shall speak of the necessity, 
wherever it is imperative that government interfere to adjust parts of the 
economic structure of the nation, that there be real community interest–not 
only among the sections of this great country, but among the economic 
units and the various groups in these units…The plans we make during the 
present emergency, if we plan wisely and rest our structure upon a base 
sufficiently broad, may show the way to a more permanent safeguarding 
of our social and economic life.75 
 
It is tempting to account for this idea as a way for the Roosevelt administration to 
account for the success of early New Deal agencies, many of which involved 
intense interaction between the government and industry.  However, this is not the 
case–such ideas were prevalent long before FDR’s inauguration, as suggested by 
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. in The Crisis of the Old Order: 
Roosevelt’s preconvention speeches, culminating with his address at 
Oglethorpe, had foreshadowed, unmistakably if vaguely, a conception of 
                                                 
75 Roosevelt, “Introduction,” Looking Forward, 13. 
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an organic economy in which government, accepting the drive of modern 
technology towards bigness, would seek to reorganize the chaotic business 
order into a system of national integration.76 
 
In this way, the idea of government partnership should be seen as a critical idea to 
Roosevelt before the presidency, not as a rationalization for new government 
agencies.  Government partnership quickly became wrapped up in the actions and 
ideas of Roosevelt's key advisors as well–whether they approved or not. 
 It is difficult to discern when Raymond Moley started to break with the 
Roosevelt administration’s core theories–a break certainly complete by the 
beginning of the administration’s second term.  Moley’s memoirs, openly 
supportive or critical of most policies, do not take a position here on Roosevelt’s 
ideas of government partnership.  Still, the inclusiveness of Moley’s recollection 
points to the fact that this theme of cooperation between government and private 
industry is not simply a passing phrase, but a central tenant to Roosevelt’s 
ideology, as evidenced by the aforementioned essays and introduction of Looking 
Forward.  In constructing an early draft of the speech, Moley recalls Roosevelt’s 
identification with the word “partnership” as a key term to be used in the fireside 
chat.  When coupled with “planning,” an idea rooted throughout Roosevelt’s 
agricultural and industrial writings, Moley remarks that it became a key part of 
the legislative agenda: “The key words here are ‘partnership’ and ‘planning.’  
They meant partnership in planning by government in collaboration with private 
                                                 
76 Schlesinger, The Crisis of the Old Order, 415.  Again, it is important to note that the Oglethorpe 
address was the foundational text for the “Need For Economic Planning” essay contained in 
Looking Forward.  
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interests.  This was, it seemed to me, a very important matter of policy.”77  Here, 
in contributing to the fireside chat, Moley emphasizes the idea of government 
partnership not only as a way to create a connection between the New Deal and 
the people, but in constructing New Deal policy itself.  This, however, does not 
mean that Roosevelt took such change lightly.  In working with Roosevelt 
throughout the editing process, Moley pointed out the critical change of policy 
that the administration would be making–gone would be the days of laissez faire 
economics, replaced with a government relationship that might be viewed, at best, 
as controversial.78  Moley recalled the president’s response: 
F.D.R. looked graver than he had been at any moment since the night 
before his inauguration.  And then, when he had been silent a few minutes, 
he said, “If that philosophy hadn’t proved to be bankrupt, Herbert Hoover 
would be sitting here right now, I never felt surer of anything in my life 
than I do of the soundness of this passage.”79 
 
Schlesinger and Freidel both quote this specific section of Moley's memoirs, 
giving credence to not only FDR’s decision to include such dialogue in the 
fireside address, but to the importance of government partnership in practice.80  In 
addition, Schlesinger’s The Coming of the New Deal accounts for the differing 
visions of industrial planning, summarizing the views of Moley, Tugwell, 
Harriman, Swope, and other New Dealers as to how they would affect the 
                                                 
77 Moley, The First New Deal, 291.   
78 Moley, After Seven Years, in Lawrence W. and Cornelia R. Levine, The People and the 
President: America’s Conversation with FDR (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), 64-65. 
79 Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1939), 189.  
This passage seems to be the most commonly quoted reference to the second fireside chat, quoted 
by Schlesinger, Freidel, Burns and Kennedy. 
80 Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal, 98 and Freidel, Launching the New Deal, 433-434. 
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president’s viewpoints.81 Thus, the idea of government partnership was not 
developed to explain the operation of New Deal efforts, it was the New Deal–a 
central tenant to solving the crisis that was the Great Depression. 
The idea of government partnership brings together ideas for industry and 
agriculture, revealing not only their importance to New Deal reform, but also 
clarifying their ideological purpose to the people.  FDR used the fireside chat to 
make clear his intentions for recovery: 
It is wholly wrong to call the measures that we have taken government 
control of farming or government control of industry, or a government 
control of transportation.  It is rather a partnership–a partnership between 
government and farming, a partnership between government and industry, 
and a partnership between government and transportation.  Not a 
partnership in profits, because the profits will still go to the private citizen, 
but rather a partnership in planning, and a partnership to see that the plans 
are carried out.82 
 
This section of the speech presents the intentions of partnership not as an increase 
to presidential power, but as a method to stabilize the American economy and 
profit margins.  Roosevelt, keenly aware of how the demise of laissez-faire 
economics would affect the outlook on his administration, sought to embody the 
policies of the New Deal as a partnership with all the people as much as with 
industrial and agricultural leaders (see fig 1).  Framing such partnership with 
industry as essential for healthy economic growth, the speech followed up with an 
example of applied partnership in the cotton industry.  FDR took the high road  
                                                 
81 Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal, 92-94. 
82 Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, May 7, 1933. 
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Figure 1.  John Knott, “Latest Portrait,” The Dallas Morning News, May 9, 1933. 
 
here, arguing industry followed suit and took action to correct unhealthy practices 
in their production, the cutthroat strategies of fewer than 10 percent would ruin 
production for an entire industry.  According to Roosevelt, this situation should 
prompt government action in order to prevent such behavior.83  Building the 
argument in this manner, Roosevelt preyed upon the public’s distaste for 
domineering industry, giving credence to FDR’s need for enhanced power in 
order to control the evils of corporate America instead of attracting undue 
attention toward the White House itself. 
                                                 
83 Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, May 7, 1933. 
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Roosevelt’s draft of the second fireside address reveals editing that further 
refined the ideas he intended to broadcast without undue focus on presidential 
power.  One deleted section dealt with the Farm Bill, specifically referencing the 
operation of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration in limiting production: 
“The answer is based upon the sound principal of limiting production in the actual 
enforcement and operation.”84 An obvious reason for this section’s removal 
connects to clarity–it does not meet the criteria that rhetorical studies have paid so 
much attention to.  When looking closer, however, it may have been cut because 
of the information it provides.  Roosevelt had already outlined a tremendous 
amount of government intervention within his program, and using words like 
“enforcement” and “operation” might have made an agricultural class, already 
nervous about government intervention, oppose the president’s policy.  Another 
section removed from the final draft deals with the powers the president accepted 
during the “emergency:” 
I have asked and have received powers that will go a long way to lift us 
out of the erroneous conditions of two months ago, but I want to assure the 
people of this country that I shall use this power to check unsound 
expansion as firmly as I shall use it to lift the burden of the depression.85 
 
Again, the revisions here signify a concern over expanding presidential power.  
The people, following the banking chat, seem almost unanimously behind 
Roosevelt activating the power given to him.  Why make it a point to discuss this 
                                                 
84 Franklin Roosevelt, Draft of Fireside Chat, May 7, 1933, Master Speech File. Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, NY, hereafter FDR Library. 
85 Franklin Roosevelt, Draft of Fireside Chat, May 7, 1933, Master Speech File, FDR Library. 
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fact specifically?  These revisions point out the importance of content within the 
chats, establishing a balance between educating the public of the administration’s 
goals and portraying the New Deal as an aggressive yet completely legal solution 
to the country’s economic woes. 
 
Framing the New Deal Program: Power, Conservation and the Tree Army 
 The headline of the New York Times on May 7 read “President Roosevelt 
to Discuss Plans for the Future,” including the tagline “President Roosevelt is 
scheduled to summarize the work accomplished by his administration and discuss 
plans for future action.”86  Taking cues from the Times, the accentuation of 
agricultural and industrial philosophy is absolutely critical to the rhetoric of New 
Deal reform, but should not discount the importance of other New Deal agencies 
that saw their first public discussion by Roosevelt (albeit not always by name) in 
the second fireside address. In this address, Roosevelt introduced the newly 
minted Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) and what would become the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).  In Looking Forward, Roosevelt makes clear, 
despite a highly touted mission against overproduction, that the expansion of civil 
projects to create roads, develop electrification, as well as maintain America’s 
landscape were important parts of government planning that would build progress 
towards national economic health.87  Roosevelt continually linked both 
                                                 
86 “President Roosevelt to Discuss Plans for the Future,” New York Times, May 7, 1933. 
87 Roosevelt, “Need for Economic Planning,” Looking Forward, 48. 
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conservation projects to maintain the American landscape with the problem of 
unemployment, forming a direct connection between the CCC and putting 
Americans back to work. 
  In October of 1933, Roosevelt’s personal confidant Louis Howe 
recounted conservation efforts in New York State in a letter to L.W. Robert, 
setting up Roosevelt’s New York programs as potential precursors to the CCC.  
Admittedly, Howe acknowledged how comprehensive the CCC effort was: “It 
seems to me that there is plenty of credit due [to] everybody who saw the 
importance of this fine project.”88  The CCC undoubtedly became a central focus 
of the young administration, and most every advisor close to FDR had their hand 
in its development.  Interestingly enough, the major advisors recount the birth of 
the CCC quite differently.  Raymond Moley suggests that a conversation with 
Francis Perkins stimulated an idea for workers to be paid one dollar per day for 
work in the area of conservation.  Following this discussion, Moley recounts a 
conversation later that day with FDR, who in turn dictated the foundational 
structure for the CCC.89  Perkins does not deny such a discussion, but mentions 
her own meeting with FDR in connection to the CCC, leading to the Department 
of Labor’s involvement in the program.90  Rexford Tugwell reports a completely 
different origin for the corps, arguing that FDR met separately with him in order 
                                                 
88 Louis Howe to L.W. Robert, October 13, 1933; Folder: Civilian Conservation Corps; 
President’s Personal File; Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt; Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde 
Park, New York. 
89 Moley, The First New Deal, 269-270. 
90 Francis Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (1946; repr., New York: Penguin Group, 2011), 169. 
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to build the corps though the forestry service.91  This matches Roosevelt’s 
leadership style perfectly–the president, unbeknownst to his staff, repeatedly 
dedicated several individuals to the same project, often brewing contention within 
the administration.92 Still, the collaboration between so many departments in the 
young administration suggests the importance behind this fledgling conservation 
agency.  
 Scarcely more than a week after the inauguration, FDR sent a memo to the 
secretaries of War, Interior, Agriculture and Labor regarding the development of 
the Civilian Conservation Corps–it was to be a joint venture, and the heads of 
these departments were to advise on the construction of such a program.93  FDR 
requested a dialogue on public works in general, and received back a specific 
suggestion: separate the public works initiative into separate bills, complete with 
specific requirements for each.  Overall, the cabinet advisors became concerned 
with government control over labor in an urban setting, recommending that the 
CCC be exclusively restricted to soil and conservation work in order to avoid 
competition with the private sector.  In addition, the creation of centers for 
conservation employment in the countryside might prevent tremendous migration 
                                                 
91 Tugwell, Roosevelt’s Revolution, 78. 
92 Robert Schlesinger, White House Ghosts, 5-13.  Schlesinger uses the development of the 
inaugural address through speechwriters Moley, Rosenman, and Howe to illustrate the competitive 
nature of speechwriting for FDR.  Such competition can be seen throughout the administration, 
especially regarding new legislation.   
93 FDR to Secretaries of War, Interior, Agriculture, and Labor, March 14, 1933; Folder: Civilian 
Conservation Corps; President’s Official File; Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt; Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, hereafter FDR Library. 
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to urban areas in pursuit of government work.94   It is possible that Roosevelt’s 
cabinet was influenced by the very real fear that massive numbers of Americans 
would soon travel extreme distances in search of work, and rural assignment of 
such camps might prevent widespread transiency among the idle poor.  These 
concerns, as well as the overarching plan for the Civilian Conservation Corps, 
evolved to become a key section of Roosevelt’s fireside address. 
 Discussed towards the beginning of the chat, it is clear that FDR wished to 
introduce the already established CCC as a partial resolution to the unemployment 
crisis.  Still, the themes suggested by the cadre of advisors in March show 
through, as the Corps is portrayed as an important conservation endeavor as well: 
We are giving opportunity of employment to a quarter of a million of the 
unemployed, especially the young men who have dependents, to let them 
go into forestry and flood prevention work…And in creating this Civilian 
Conservation Corps we are killing two birds with one stone.  We are 
clearly enhancing the value of our natural resources, and at the same time 
we are relieving an incredible amount of actual distress.95 
 
By suggesting that the CCC would be focused on conservation work, Roosevelt 
belayed concerns of urban listeners perhaps worried that the program would 
compete with industrial workforces.  In addition, Roosevelt concluded his 
discussion of the Corps with a guarantee that it was not an army in the regular 
sense of the term, but a “tree army” that would transform America’s landscape:96 
                                                 
94Secretaries of War, Interior, Agriculture, and Labor to FDR, March 15, 1933; Folder: Civilian 
Conservation Corps; President’s Official File, FDR Library.  The other programs discussed are 
FERA and PWA, but precedence is clearly given to the CCC. 
95 Franklin Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, May 7, 1933. 
96 The use of the term “tree army” does not refer to any one source, but the combination of the 
military and conservation aspects of the Corps.  For an early use of the term, see Frank Ernest Hill, 
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This great group of men, young men, have entered upon their work on a 
purely voluntary basis; no military training is involved, and we are 
conserving not only our natural resources, but also our human resources.  
One of the great values to this work is the fact that it is direct and requires 
the intervention of very little machinery.97 
 
Roosevelt’s discussion of the CCC serves as an excellent example of how the 
fireside chat was used as an educational tool: an explanation of what programs 
define the administration’s agenda as well as a discussion of what the programs 
are and are not designed to do.  The presentation also had a defense mechanism 
below the surface–insisting that such measures were not to increase presidential 
power, but to attack the depression well within legitimate executive authority. 
 Like the CCC, the Tennessee Valley Authority had its roots in Looking 
Forward.  Roosevelt explored the topic of energy production in the essay “The 
Power Issue,” a good example of the president’s mistrust of private utility 
companies and their propensity to create monopolies.  Roosevelt, in turn, 
suggested the development of public utility companies for a “yardstick 
comparison:” a general idea of how much electricity should cost in the given area.  
Yardstick comparisons became common within the Senatorial debates on energy 
production in the 1920s, often centered around Senator George Norris of 
Nebraska, who worked tirelessly to develop the poverty stricken area of the 
Tennessee Valley.98  With this public-private relationship in mind, FDR suggested 
that Boulder Dam in Colorado and Muscle Shoals along the Tennessee River be 
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developed for just this purpose.99  Raymond Moley adds to this reflection, using 
Roosevelt’s campaign speech in Portland (the same speech that formed the basis 
of the “The Power Issue” in Looking Forward) to gauge Roosevelt’s perspectives 
on Muscle Shoals and the formation of the TVA.  Here, Moley recalls Roosevelt’s 
intense distrust of power companies as a motivation for the TVA, and recalls 
Roosevelt’s vision for the project a semblance of “industry, agriculture, forestry, 
and some flood control.”100  That said, public response to the fireside chat seemed 
to personally link Roosevelt to the development of Muscle Shoals even before the 
birth of the TVA, an observation the president certainly relished in and perhaps 
used to his benefit in securing legislation for rural electrification.101 
 It was clear as well that the public followed the development of the 
Tennessee Valley in conjunction with the New Deal, as letters from the public 
show.  Edwin Davis of Washington D.C., representing the Chamber of Commerce 
in Lewisburg, Tennessee, wrote to FDR supporting his campaign ideas to 
modernize the Tennessee Valley and use political support to help the program 
along locally.102  JL Austin of Chattanooga wrote to warn the administration of 
lobbyists in Washington who would stop at nothing to derail the project, even 
                                                 
99 “The Power Issue” exclusively based on a critical campaign speech in Portland, Oregon in 
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including a newspaper clipping.103  Such enclosures were extraordinarily common 
in this correspondence, as newspaper coverage of the new president’s plan for the 
Tennessee Valley brought questions from the public.  Oliver Thompson wrote in 
hopes that the administration’s future plans to develop the Valley would provide 
jobs, ideas he gleaned from the newspaper.104  There were even suggestions on 
how the administration would get the word out about such a program, as 
Bostonian Robert Paine suggested to Louis Howe that a motion picture be made 
about the project for educational purposes.105  In sum, the multitude of 
correspondence leading up to the fireside chat not only illustrates the importance 
of the Tennessee Valley project early on in the administration, but also represents 
the demand by the public to hear about FDR’s legislative agenda in some concrete 
form. 
 The most interesting of such requests came from two men, William Davis 
and William Cheek, who represented the newly founded Tennessee Valley 
Association.  Founded in anticipation of New Deal legislation to modernize 
Muscle Shoals, the association sought to assist Roosevelt as the president saw fit.  
With the idea of cooperation between Washington and the local chamber of 
commerce in mind, Davis and Cheek both wrote to Roosevelt in late April with 
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hopes that he would use the radio to inform the committee of his administration’s 
plans.106  Stephen Early, FDR’s press secretary, replied with the all too common 
response that the president’s schedule could not accommodate requests of this 
nature; there was just not enough time in the day.107  Cheek responded in turn, 
stating “we hoped that the organization[al] meeting of the Tennessee Valley 
Association might be the occasion for the President to make a radio address on the 
subject of his plans for the Tennessee Valley and the country,” ultimately 
concluding with the more reasonable request that FDR “send a wire to be read at 
meeting.”108  What makes this situation remarkable is one of the next responses in 
turn–from FDR himself.  Despite the fact that FDR’s telegram was transmitted the 
day after the fireside chat, Roosevelt seldom answered such requests himself.  The 
short message thanking the association for their work, including a snippet of his 
fireside speech, produced an enthusiastic response.109  Two conclusions can be 
made from this rapid correspondence.  First, it became clear how critical the TVA 
was to the new president, as he took time to personally wire a message to a local 
organization.  Secondly, it confirms the public’s desire for a legislative agenda 
                                                 
106 William Ross to FDR, April 21, 1933 and Will Cheek to FDR, April 24, 1933; Folder: 
Tennessee Valley Authority; President’s Personal File; Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDR 
Library. 
107 Stephen Early to Will Cheek, May 2, 1933; Folder: Tennessee Valley Authority; President’s 
Personal File; Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDR Library. 
108 Will Cheek to Stephen Early, May 4, 1933; Folder: Tennessee Valley Authority; President’s 
Personal File; Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDR Library. 
109 FDR to Will Cheek, May 8, 1933; Folder: Tennessee Valley Authority; President’s Personal 
File; Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDR Library. 
  
 
53 
 
delivered via the radio–something the second fireside chat, as well as those 
throughout the Great Depression, would deliver effectively. 
 During the chat itself, Roosevelt discussed the benefits of developing the 
area surrounding Muscle Shoals, accenting the importance of power development 
as an example of government action for the public good.  The chat focused first 
on Muscle Shoals, already a government owned property, and then moved on to 
suggest the progress of the entire area: 
I have requested the Congress and have secured action upon a proposal to 
put the great properties owned by our government at Muscle Shoals to 
work after long years of wasteful inaction, and with this goes hand-in-
hand a broad plan for the permanent improvement of the vast area 
included in the whole Tennessee Valley.  It will add to the comfort and to 
the happiness of hundreds of thousands of people and the incident benefits 
will reach the entire nation.110 
 
Here, Roosevelt makes official the development of the Tennessee Valley as part 
of his administration.  A brief statement with a critical theme: Roosevelt insists 
there is nothing radical about this change, as it is the modernization of 
government land that will benefit millions in Tennessee and across the nation.  
This is the essence of the fireside chat–a portfolio of programs that, delivered 
collectively via the radio, illustrate the majority of the New Deal program to the 
American people. 
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The Public Reacts 
 So much is written of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal and the president’s 
drive to make his liberal New Deal agenda stick.  As Roosevelt’s program grew, it 
became clear to supporters and opponents alike that the New Deal was designed 
not only to raise a people from the depths of depression, but to revolutionize 
governance in America as well.  In this way, part of this story must be told 
through the psyche of Roosevelt himself, where he believed the importance of 
these programs and their accompanying speeches lay.  Of course, FDR did not 
leave memoirs on this subject, one reason a collection of New Dealers have made 
up a considerable part of this work.  But regarding the president’s personal 
outlook on his programs, one advisor seems to rise above the rest: Secretary of 
Labor Francis Perkins.  Perkins remained one of the few New Dealers to serve the 
entire duration of Roosevelt’s presidency, and as a recruit from his administration 
as Governor of New York, few people in Washington knew Roosevelt’s 
temperament better.  Perkin’s memoir, The Roosevelt I Knew, talks of a Roosevelt 
not only in need of a direct connection with the people, but recounts the ebb and 
flow of FDR’s legislative agenda in connection to public response.  Such 
observations put the fireside chats in a new light: 
If a great many people are for a certain project, is it necessarily right?  If 
the vast majority is for it, is it even more certainly right?  This, to be sure, 
is one of the tricky points of democracy.  The minority often turns out to 
be right, and though one believes in the efficacy of the democratic process, 
one has to also recognize that the demand of the many for a particular 
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project at a particular time may mean only disaster.  Roosevelt knew and 
felt these things, but he was always tempted to go with the majority.111 
 
This short homily on democracy explains the importance of the fireside chat.  If 
Roosevelt believed he could convince America that the New Deal initiatives were 
the correct action, would that make them inherently right?  As longtime confidant 
and legal scholar Felix Frankfurter suggested, Roosevelt “took the nation to 
school” during these addresses: “you are also making the people feel–and nothing 
is more important for a democracy–that in a true sense of the word it is their 
government, and that their interests and their feelings are actively engaged.”112  In 
this way Roosevelt must have believed there was convincing to do regarding 
changes made by the New Deal, and the fireside chat became the model for this 
agenda.   With this in mind, armed with a commanding sense of urgency, Perkins 
portrays a legislatively minded Roosevelt and his surrounding cabinet: 
The speedy enactment of the program that came to be known as the New 
Deal revived the faith of the people.  It put us back on the upgrade.  It 
gave us the knowledge of industrial processes and complications which 
had never been in the possession of the government before.  It constituted 
an education for the American people and their government.113 
 
Perkins testimony establishes Franklin Roosevelt’s desire to be in touch with the 
pulse of America with a matching goal: to build a program that would be 
acceptable to the masses suffering under the Great Depression.  How would this 
program be delivered to the people?  Roosevelt could not leave this to the 
                                                 
111 Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew, 149. 
112 Felix Frankfurter to FDR, May 9, 1933; Folder: Frankfurter, Felix 1932 - April 1933; 
President’s Personal File; Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDR Library. 
113 Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew, 167. 
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newspapers, magazines or word of mouth.  The fireside chat became the most 
successful mode for outlining his program, beginning exclusively on the evening 
of May 7, 1933. 
 How do we, however, gauge FDR’s success in using the radio?  Letter 
writing is the best look into the public’s reaction to the speeches, containing not 
only praise for Roosevelt’s rhetorical leadership as historians have suggested, but 
also in the legislative agenda that dominated the speech.  The Roosevelt 
administration, in direct connection with the first presidential library in Hyde 
Park, New York, catalogued letters in response to each address made by the 
president.  In Dear FDR: A Study of Political Letter-Writing, Leila Sussmann 
develops meaningful observations about the letter writers themselves that help 
reveal the important connection between Americans and the fireside chats.  
Sussman argues that radio culture helps shift not only the rationale for political 
letter writing, but its demographic as well.  With regards to overt political issues, 
Sussman insists that educated white collar Americans far out wrote the blue collar 
laboring constituency.  The radio, however, helps recreate the culture of letter 
writing in America.  Radio programs consistently requested commentary through 
the mail, and such practice was continued when Roosevelt came on the air, 
creating a more balanced socioeconomic slice of public opinion.114  Like other 
                                                 
114 Leila Sussman, Dear FDR: A Study of Political Letter-Writing (Totowa, N.J.: The Bedminster 
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authors, Sussman provides a cursory look at FDR’s “radio presence,” establishing 
the chats as defining events of the presidency that created an “atmosphere of 
dialogue” with the people.115  With regards to the policy issues addressed within 
the letters, Sussman acknowledges the subject of policy and their potential 
importance to the administration’s communication with the nation.  In speaking 
about the fireside chats specifically, Sussman suggests that “Gaining support for 
his policies was never far from his [FDR’s] mind.”116  Sussman also points out 
that, in studies of Congressional mail, Roosevelt’s radio presence served as an 
inspiration for constituents to write their Congressman–support New Deal 
measures or run the risk of political defeat at the polls.117  Sussman, however, 
departs from these subjects quickly, leaving behind an underdeveloped connection 
between the administration and the people via the radio. 
There is, in this way, work to be done with these letters.  As seen 
throughout the foundational works on the New Deal, the historical record has 
underrepresented the valuable connection to Roosevelt’s program embedded 
within the fireside chats–a program no doubt intended to forge a bond between 
the people and the president.118  Sussmann’s examination of the letters proves no 
                                                 
measurement of status is not the purpose of this work, it is important to note that the letters 
considered represented a wide scope of professions and socioeconomic stations. 
115 Sussmann, 112-113. 
116 Ibid., 114. 
117 Ibid., 78. 
118 The foundational works referenced here are Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s The Coming of the New 
Deal, James Macgregor Burns’ Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, Frank Freidel’s Franklin D. 
Roosevelt: Launching the New Deal, and William Leuchtenburg’s Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 
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different, leaving the story of this invaluable resource incomplete.  While 
important to recognize the overwhelming majority of people who commented on 
the speaking style of Roosevelt, it is also important to evaluate the percentage of 
writers who were impacted from a policy standpoint.   Of the over seven hundred 
letters received making specific reference to the second fireside address, more 
than 20 percent discussed the legislative agenda directly: whether it be a 
commentary of Roosevelt’s agricultural, industrial, or financial programs or key 
components of the address such as “government partnership,” “cutthroat 
competition,” and “living wages.”  20 percent is not a majority, but a segment of 
the population that can hardly be ignored.  The interconnected themes of 
Roosevelt’s legislative agenda reappear not only in the mailroom but in the 
newspaper editorials, commentary and the like.  Newspapers often touted FDR’s 
speech as an overview of legislative endeavors, as the Chicago Tribune reports: 
“[Roosevelt] is going on the air tonight for the express purpose of reporting to the 
people on the accomplishments of his administration since March 4 and to tell 
them what further action may be expected from the special session of 
Congress.”119  This combination of newspaper response and letters from the 
American public show a distinctive pattern: Americans used the fireside chat to 
understand Roosevelt’s legislative agenda, and made their judgments clear to the 
administration through these two mediums. 
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 Writers answering Roosevelt’s second fireside chat responded 
overwhelmingly to his commentary connected to “cutthroat competition.”  R.H. 
Adams of Minneapolis wrote specifically about the intentional sale of goods far 
below wholesale prices, making businesses in all fields of economic competition 
suffer greatly.120 C.F. Torbert of Birmingham suggested the same effect, and 
provided in his letter that 5 percent of merchant businesses in his town alone 
operated unfairly, leading to people throughout the community to become 
“busted.”121  Quite a few letters echoed Roosevelt’s observation that a 
comparative few were behind the struggling economy, some of whom referred 
directly to the example dealing with the cotton industry.  Lynn Wood Heel of 
Keene, New Hampshire suggested that Roosevelt “hit the nail right on the head,” 
insisting that “10% of the members of the trade business” competed unfairly, 
which further “made it impossible for that industry to operate on a profitable 
basis.”122  Perhaps John Senior of Tampa Bay best encapsulated the focus on 
cutthroat competition: 
As an individual having extensive interests and substantial investments in 
the securities of an industry engaged in the manufacture of an important 
commodity[,] namely Portland Cement[.] I am encouraged by your 
Sunday night radio address to believe that you have a plan for analyzing 
the problems of and protecting the various manufacturing industries 
against the ruinous competitive practice by which they have been engaged 
to the end that proper prices may be realized[,] thus establishing a 
                                                 
120 R.H. Adams to FDR, May 9, 1933; Folder: May 7, 1933; President’s Personal File–Public 
Response; Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDR Library. 
121 C.F. Torbert to FDR, May 10, 1933; Folder: May 7, 1933; President’s Personal File–Public 
Response; Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDR Library. 
122 Lynn Wood Heel to FDR, May 12, 1933; Folder: May 7, 1933; President’s Personal File–
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safeguard for the best interests of the investors in and the employees of 
such industries…123 
 
Clearly, Roosevelt focused on the natural tendency to suspect deceitful behavior 
in industry, a line of thinking that struck a chord with listeners pondering their 
own situation and the state of American manufacturing in general. 
 As with John Senior, there was a solid contingency of writers that owned 
businesses and wrote as industrialists or company leaders, less than as common 
citizens.   Their responses, however, differed little in substance when compared to 
the common observer, and produced the same supportive tones as well.  Benjamin 
Creskoff of Philadelphia, a leader in the Navytone men’s clothing company, 
suggested the idea of a thirty hour week and a control over wages should help the 
industry overall.  Creskoff suggests that the industrial leaders in his area support 
Roosevelt in his reform efforts, and only wish that the president would speak via 
the radio more frequently.124  Edward Pose of Burbank sends a similar message, 
suggesting the operation of his laundry business had become all but impossible 
due to unfair competition.  While Pose does not wish to burden Roosevelt with his 
personal struggles, he had clearly given up on government assistance with the 
problem, suggesting the “raising of prices must come from the White House as 
local, state, and national organizations have utterly failed.”125  Al Mathieu of 
                                                 
123 John Senior to FDR, May 12, 1933; Folder: May 7, 1933; President’s Personal File–Public 
Response Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDR Library.  Due to the format of this telegram, 
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124 Benjamin Creskoff to FDR, May 10, 1933; Folder: May 7, 1933; President’s Personal File–
Public Response; Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDR Library. 
125 Edward Pose to FDR, May 11, 1933; Folder: May 7, 1933; President’s Personal File–Public 
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Albuquerque suggested that not only had government regulations failed, but the 
government itself had taken part in purchasing rubber at cutthroat levels as 
well.126  To take it a step further, there were also several letters written from trade 
associations that represented multiple factions of an industry.  W.E. McCollum’s 
letter from Chicago, a response on behalf of several hundred companies linked 
through the distribution of plumbing supplies, offered a collective pledge of their 
cooperation for the “elimination of cutthroat competition.”127  Naturally, there 
should be skepticism when industrialists veer from the laissez-faire tradition, but 
as Domhoff and Weber instruct, the participation of business owners and larger 
industrialists were not only common but critical to the development of New Deal 
legislation.  Whether support for Roosevelt’s programs was genuine or not, these 
letters cement a legislative connection between Roosevelt and his listeners.  The 
savagery of cutthroat competition clearly resonated on some level with these 
individuals, recounting injustice in industry and supporting Roosevelt in his 
crusade to destroy such industrialists, despite the likelihood that they were peers 
within a comparable industry. 
 Response from letter writers were equally supportive on the topic of a 
living wage.  As expected, several of these letters came down hard on business 
owners and saw Roosevelt’s plan as a way out.  William Arnos of Cleveland 
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made clear his aversion to the current business hierarchy, warning Roosevelt that 
“broken promises by captains of industry aided the disorderly renowned 
character, “Prosperity around the corner,” to sneak away under camouflage.”  
Comparatively, Arnos sees hope in Roosevelt’s plan of action, one which 
“transforms National Policy from the ridiculous to the sublime.”128   Adding to a 
litany of ideas mentioned in the fireside chat, JV Tarantino of San Francisco 
lambasted business owners, suggesting Roosevelt’s address spoke “the truth:” 
You are right, Mr. President.  You have said the truth, the whole truth.  
Cheap wages, unfair methods of competition, and cut throat prices are 
responsible, to-day, for all those millions of starving Americans; they are 
to be blamed for the economic and industrial chaos; they have poisoned, 
for the last four years, all the channels of commercial life in America.129 
 
To be sure, FDR’s speech appealed to the hatred directed towards 
behemoth industrial corporations and their captains of industry at the helm.  
However, the fact that this letter refers to the key ideas of cutthroat competition 
and low wages is not an empty criticism of the business elite, but an outlook on 
industrial policy found within the New Deal.  This is especially true regarding 
business owners themselves, who wrote to the president in support of wage 
legislation and raising employment numbers in cooperation with the government 
programs addressed during the chat.  Kenneth Waldon of Atlantic City took the 
administration’s recommendation of wage escalation to heart, dedicating “our full 
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support toward the success of this program, especially in regard to raising wages 
as fast as we can raise our selling prices.”130  E.M. Schnadig from Chicago wrote 
to the employment situation, stating that they have raised their workforce by 10 
percent in connection with Roosevelt’s program.131  This does not, however, mean 
that all writers were in favor of the industrial program.  While few and far 
between, there were detractors like Felton Taylor of San Francisco.  Taylor 
pointed out that he was in support of the plans set forth in the second fireside chat, 
but also states that “it is a little inconsistent to advise employers not to reduce 
wages, or salaries, when at the same time you have taken steps to reduce 
government employee’s salaries.”132  Still, all of these letters, whether written by 
an industrial skeptic or from inside management’s office, represent a clear interest 
in Roosevelt’s program as it sought to transform government, industry, and a 
destroyed American economy. 
 There was support for the ideological basis of the New Deal program 
embedded in these letters as well.  Concern with overproduction, a prevailing idea 
of Roosevelt’s Looking Forward and the dialogue of New Dealers alike, is riddled 
throughout the letters.  Overwhelming support rained in for the crusade against 
                                                 
130 Kenneth Waldon to FDR, May 7, 1933; Folder: May 7, 1933; President’s Personal File–Public 
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surplus, as New Yorker Leo Gottesman, president of an association for milliners, 
suggested that surplus production “has long been an outstanding evil in our 
industry and we do trust that your policies regarding the same are brought to a 
successful conclusion.”133 Some letters supported Roosevelt’s actions, but made 
clear their nervousness and apprehension for change despite the continuing crisis.  
Such was the case of the Staffords, a farming couple who identified with 
Roosevelt’s effort to control surplus, but worried that limits curtailing production 
would put undue pressure on the common farmer and not monstrous companies.  
Still, the signature line of the Stafford’s letter reveals their ultimate dedication: “If 
we, who are but mice, could help gnaw the bonds which trammel our lion, it is the 
wish of your friends.”134  That being said, some of the earliest criticism of the 
administration’s industrial policy can be seen through these letters as well.  
Richard Joslin of Oakland, California, provides an in-depth account of the speech 
and its interconnected legislative agenda.  Beginning his letter with the harsh 
reality that there was no surplus for the poor, Joslin insisted that production not 
slow, but be redirected to fix unemployment, produce more products, and, in turn, 
allow the poor to escape “destitution.”  Still, despite harsh pangs of criticism 
related to the curtailment of surplus, Joslin is still markedly supportive of New 
Deal policy, referring to Roosevelt’s “marvelous chess game” that included bank 
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reform, “dictatorship,” the Tennessee Valley, capitalism, and the destruction of 
the gold standard.135 
 But Roosevelt made quite clear his desire to avoid the dictator moniker, 
perhaps using the language of government partnership.  Public reaction to this 
idea as well showed through vividly in letters to the president.  De Lancey 
Kountze of New York City, from a business perspective, welcomed the idea of 
partnership: “to a business men, who, with his associates and employees, has 
suffered, the idea of the Government looking with favor to helping industry and 
becoming, in a way, a partner, is most reassuring.”136   Bostonian John Cutter also 
used the language of business, suggesting that “we also like the ‘partnership’ idea, 
particularly in view of the fact that there is a senior partner with a strong hand.  I 
know the firm will prosper.”137   Aside from a business standpoint, there were 
letters exclaiming excitement in simply being part of the solution.   John Meloan 
wrote from Frankfurt, Kentucky, that FDR’s program “meets the approval of 
everybody here in the capitol.”138 Viola Wildermuth wrote of her “hope that all 
our people, and our neighbors too, will fast become members of that Great 
Partnership,” regretting only that “I am not now a member of the Government 
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family of workers.”139  Wildermuth’s letter offers a rare feminine outlook on 
participation in the workforce not found elsewhere in this group of letters, 
suggesting that even those at home may have valued this idea of partnership.  
Some even recounted the partnership idea as one that became interconnected with 
other sections of the chat, as A. Kiefer Mayer of Indianapolis wrote: 
Your recommendation given over the radio last Sunday night in regards to 
industry and government joining hands to protect the profits of industry, 
create additional employment, increase wages, etc. is the soundest and 
most constructive thought that has been advanced by any president of this 
country for over a century.140 
 
To say there was support for the idea of connecting the government with 
industrial and agricultural interests would be an understatement when considering 
the emotional response of these letters. 
 Appeal for FDR’s government partnership plan was not only covered by 
most newspapers, but often became the dominant idea that periodicals focused on 
when recapping the speech.  The May 8 edition of the New York Times placed “a 
partnership between government, farming, industry, and transportation” second to 
only the financial concern of inflationary powers by removing the gold standard, a 
logical choice considering the Times focus on the monetary aspects of the 
depression.  Using the heading “Reveals New Measures,” the daily recounted not 
only the development of New Deal programs, but also illustrated how new 
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programs would employ a cooperative endeavor between industry and 
government to solve the ills of the great depression.141  The Boston Globe reported 
the idea of government partnership in the first lines of the radio speech’s 
summary story.  Under the lead title “President Tells Plans to Nation,” the first 
lines read “President Roosevelt outlined to the Nation tonight his ideas for a 
“partnership” between the Government and agriculture, industry, and 
transportation in a full exposition of his policies–past and future.”142 Such 
emphasis continued in an editorial close to a week later, in which James Morgan 
of the Globe recounted the speech, stating “In his radio speech last Sunday night 
he protested that the true objective of the several measures of his Administration 
is not governmental control but rather a partnership.”143  From these sources, the 
speech’s landmark statement about government partnership was covered 
emphatically, a testimony as to the importance of the idea within the psyche of 
America’s listeners. 
 This is not to say, however, that the response was unanimously positive to 
such a partnership idea.  Several letters recounted the partnership as a degradation 
of traditional power bases in America–whether they stemmed from the White 
House or the offices of industry.  New Yorker Paul Dennis wrote that the word 
partnership was “too weak,” and that it took “ammunition” out of executive 
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power.144  In a contrasting nature, most criticism of the partnership idea was 
founded on the belief that sections of industry could not afford to lose their 
influence in floundering market.  George Livesey of Bellingham, Washington, 
wrote in support of the legislative policies discussed in the chat, but added with a 
conservative gusto “I sincerely hope that an effort will be made to keep the 
government out of business as much as possible.”145  Although not using the term 
“partnership” specifically, Leon Gutman wrote with concern for “the small 
manufacturer” in an environment where the government directed industry.146  
Gutman’s letter, in pointing out that the small manufacturer might be left by the 
wayside when Roosevelt’s acts take effect, can be seen as representative for many 
of the letters received by the administration.147  These laws would produce an 
interconnection between the government and the economy, and each time a letter 
mentioned an action by the administration it seems as though the idea of 
partnership was an underlining factor.  Complimentary or not, the idea of 
government partnership was a fundamental theme in these letters–actions the 
government would take to form a new bond with the American economy that had 
never existed before. 
                                                 
144 Paul Dennis to FDR, May 8, 1933; Folder: May 7, 1933; President’s Personal File–Public 
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 Muscle Shoals and the development of the Civilian Conservation Corps 
waned as subjects in the letters, although there is passing discussion of these 
programs.   In addition to the aforementioned Tennessee Valley Association and 
their desire to hear Roosevelt justify the development of their area over the radio, 
several letters from across the country complimented Roosevelt on his decision to 
bring activity to the Tennessee Valley.  Georgia college student Oswald Chapman 
wrote in favor of developing the valley, and suggested that democracy would be 
well served by the project.148 Edson Smith, in a telegram from Pittsburgh, praised 
the idea of Muscle Shoals’ development, but expressed concern in its competition 
with private industry.  Like most of the ideas addressed in the fireside chat, there 
were detractors against development of the Tennessee Valley as well.  Albert and 
Edith Foster of Lansing, Michigan, in disagreeing with the Muscle Shoals 
program, provide a conservative critique of the New Deal with regard to financial 
security: “Perhaps differing with the administration is unpopular at present, but 
we fail to see where Muscle Shoals, reforestation, railroad aid, etc., is going to 
return our own money…we honestly don’t see how any degree of prosperity can 
be attained until the basic financial foundation is made right.”149  Regarding 
conservation work, several letters referred to support for the Corps and their 
forestry missions in passing.  H.D. Strunk of McCook, Nebraska, discussed the 
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development of flood prevention and reported that the President’s plan for such a 
program was “meeting with much favor” in his area.150  Louis Haeffele of 
Dayton, Kentucky, also discussed flood control with regard to the Ohio River, a 
program that has “given us some hope for the future.”151  To be fair, the 
Tennessee Valley and Civilian Conservation Corps projects occupied a smaller 
proportion of the fireside chat when compared to agricultural and industrial 
reform, and most definitely the idea of government partnership, and so a smaller 
contingency of letters on this subjects seems reasonable. 
 The Civilian Conservation Corps, among all of the New Deal programs 
mentioned in the fireside address, has one unique mode that can be used to 
measure success: enrollment.  Likely because of Roosevelt’s concern for the 
CCC’s development, personal secretary Louis Howe received memos from 
Duncan Major of the War Department cataloging program enrollment, beginning 
April 18, 1933.  Enrollment grew slowly in the beginning, adding approximately 
one to two thousand a day, sometimes less.  A little over a week after the May 7 
address, a jump of close to 4,000 men occurred, and from that point forward 
enrollment increased exponentially, moving closer to Roosevelt’s goal of 250,000 
by mid-summer 1933 (see fig. 2).152  As an event that dominated the airwaves, the 
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151 Louis Haeffele to FDR, May 1933; Folder: May 7, 1933; President’s Personal File–Public 
Response; Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDR Library.  Date for this letter is not legible. 
152 Duncan Major to Louis Howe, April 18–June 5, 1933.  Folder: CCC–April, 1933, May 1-15, 
1933, May 16-30, 1933, June, 1933; President’s Official File; Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDR 
Library. 
 71 
 
  
  
F
ig
u
re
 2
. 
 E
n
ro
ll
m
en
t 
n
u
m
b
er
s 
ta
b
u
la
te
d
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
en
ce
 o
f 
L
o
u
is
 H
o
w
e,
 P
er
so
n
a
l 
S
ec
re
ta
ry
 t
o
 t
h
e 
P
re
si
d
en
t,
 a
n
d
 C
o
l.
 D
u
n
ca
n
 M
aj
o
r,
 
W
ar
 D
ep
ar
tm
en
t.
 
  
 
72 
 
fireside chat provides the best explanation for how Americans would have heard 
about this program.  This, however, is not the only factor that should be 
considered to explain increased enrollment.  CCC Administrator Robert Fechner 
did deliver a radio broadcast explaining the bill that established the Corps and a 
description of its general operation on May 6, the day before the chat.153  Still, 
Fechner is not FDR, and his broadcast does not match the popularity of the 
fireside chat.  Secondly, FDR signed into law an addendum to the original CCC 
legislation allowing World War I veterans to be enrolled in the Corps, thus 
averting potential disaster when faced with a Bonus Army in the capital.154  
Finally, Frank Persons of the Labor department directed several changes in the 
enrollment processes for the CCC on May 8, potentially speeding up the 
enrollment process as well.  In a memo sent to Robert Fechner on May 8, Persons 
suggests that the Department of Labor had employed public opinion to locate and 
recruit members of the CCC, but there was no better connection between the 
administration and the world of public opinion than the fireside chat, given the 
previous evening.155  The fireside chat, the Bonus Army addendum, and the 
change in enrollment procedure cannot individually explain the rise in enrollment 
in the CCC.  Rather, the sudden jump in enrollment can be explained by several 
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factors that worked in concert with each other, the May 7 address being the 
driving force behind educating America of the employment program.   
A final issue that drew a response from letter writers was that of the Gold 
Standard.  In these letters, concerns surrounding gold were often paired with 
another idea from the fireside chat, whether it was wages, unemployment, 
government partnership, or perhaps in connection with the first chat on the bank 
holiday.  Historians and New Dealers alike speculate that this area captured the 
least of FDR’s legislative talents, as most point to the influence of the Hoover 
administration in creating the bank holiday.  In addition, Moley credits a mix of 
Roosevelt and Hoover advisors during the banking crisis.  According to Moley, 
Ogden Mills, treasury secretary under Hoover, as well as William Woodin and 
Arthur Ballantine, Roosevelt appointees, were instrumental in creating the 
banking holiday framework, a set of policies that became the broad focus of the 
first chat.156  In terms of the gold standard, Raymond Moley recounts the decision 
to abandon the traditional foundation for the monetary system as a political 
necessity to prevent the death of the Farm Bill.  During the election, Roosevelt 
felt tremendous pressure from the Midwest “to do something about silver,” 
namely remonetize the struggling currency.  Now, according to Moley, 
midwestern Senators “demanded this promise be redeemed.”  Something needed 
to be done, or it might jeopardize agricultural reform, namely the Farm Bill.  And 
so the administration supported the Thomas Amendment to the Farm Bill, which 
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allowed the President to modify the value of gold and silver against the dollar, an 
inflationary power that drew praise and abhorrence at the same time.157   
The fireside chat hoped to explain this process, and, as expected, drew a 
mixed response–especially from the press.   The New York Times, a paper 
consistently covering the financial sector of the country, produced a curious 
reaction to the inflationary policy.   On May 10, the Times ran a comment from 
Wall Street bankers suggesting that Roosevelt oversimplified the gold policy, and 
that government could have solved the economic catastrophe and still kept the 
value of the dollar consistent with the gold standard.  However, there was no open 
criticism of the administration, potentially in light of Roosevelt’s overwhelming 
popularity at the time.158  Days later, on May 13, the Times printed a letter to the 
editor entitled “Value of Gold Dollars: Changing It Seen as Likely to Work an 
Injustice,” which criticized the administration for controlling the supply of gold 
and the negative impact the policy would have on investments: “The President’s 
declared objective of raising commodity prices by the arbitrary method of 
cheapening money…means the confiscation of part of the property every man 
who had in gold and turned it in and every man who has a life insurance policy or 
a bank account of any description.”159  However, not all assessments of the 
Administration’s gold policy were taken as an attack on property.  In the years 
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ahead Walter Lippmann would be openly critical of the New Deal, but in this case 
offered tremendous praise regarding the financial aspects of the fireside chat.  In a 
syndicated article on May 9, Lippmann praised Roosevelt for resisting the 
temptation of depicting the “present speculation as a victory,” asserting that a 
combination of public works and inflationary measures might bring about some 
economic progress.  By the end of the article, Lippmann suggested that 
inflationary practices might carry over into banks, “expected to cooperate by 
relaxing pressure on debtors,” and industry, by supporting “organized actions 
against further price cutting and further wage reductions.”160  Mirroring 
Lippmann’s commentary, an article from the Chicago Tribune published before 
the fireside chat even aired speculated that the speech itself might “douse a little 
cold water on extravagant inflation hopes,” essentially arguing the administration 
might use inflationary practices in a cautious way.161 
A mixed response to the gold standard was felt through the letters arriving 
from the public as well.  Fred Lockley of Portland, Oregon, wrote not only in 
support of Roosevelt’s decisions connected to currency, but was impressed with 
his “sincerity” on the subject.162  Clearly speaking from a different perspective, 
Daniel Luten of Indianapolis began his letter with the belief that Roosevelt had 
received much praise, and that the president might “welcome one in partial 
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criticism.”  Luten went on to question the legitimacy of the decision to allow for 
inflation, ironically suggesting he had “heard the same plan made so often by the 
farmer inflationists of the West.”  Luten concluded his damning criticism with the 
warning that once inflation has been invoked, it cannot be controlled, and will 
spiral out of control.163  Still, good or bad, the decision to remove the gold 
standard and support the Thomas Amendment does fall under a legislative 
agenda, and still represents an education of New Deal policy for the people.  
Some, such as Arthur Young of Buffalo, actually wrote the administration 
requesting such a radio explanation of administrative policy, in this case of the 
decision to erase the gold standard: 
In view of the uncertainty concerning the effect of abandonment of the 
gold standard permit me to suggest that you or some other well qualified 
spokesmen for the government give a 15 minute or more talk over the 
radio similar to the address which so ably made to the public regarding the 
bank holidays.  It seems to me the American people would welcome and 
appreciate such a talk in simple terms to enlighten them on the subject.164 
 
While seemingly not part of the New Deal’s legislative agenda, the gold standard 
does represent policy from the administration, and in this way, embodies the 
fireside chat’s ability to educate the public of FDR’s program.  Reponses such as 
Young’s clearly solidify the idea that the public saw the fireside chats as a way to 
become acclimated to the New Deal as it enveloped the country. 
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 As Young’s letter indicates, the fireside chat quickly became an 
expectation from the people, a means the president would use to communicate 
with the nation.  To be sure, the medium was a valued opportunity to hear the 
celebrated president speak to the nation, but the content he would present 
provided the people with an equally intimate relationship on how the 
administration would pull the country out of depression.  To this point, members 
of Congress also anxiously awaited the subject of the radio address as well.  On 
May 7, the morning before the second fireside chat, the Times ran a story entitled 
“Congressmen are uneasy about Roosevelt Speech.”  The story reported a general 
nervousness in Congress over the possibility Roosevelt would use the radio to 
demand powers he did not already have or ideas he has yet shared, specifically 
calling in war debt from World War I to help budget problems.165  This possible 
“war debt legislation” did not come to light during the chat, but the absence of 
this discussion from the chat says much about the planning and purpose of the 
address from the standpoint of the administration.  Congress’ fear of the speech 
not only affirms the effectiveness of Roosevelt’s use of the radio, but also 
suggests that the content of the speech, specifically legislative priorities of the 
administration, were of upmost importance.   Congress would show less, if any, 
concern if the chats only strength lay with their delivery.   Surely, the issue of war 
debt would certainly appear if Roosevelt wanted to address the concerns of 
Congress.  The war debt issue, however, appears nowhere in the chat.  In this 
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way, the fireside chats were truly about the president’s legislative agenda 
whenever possible, not the perspectives of Congress. 
 This, however, did not stop the people from comparing the White House 
to Congress in light of the fireside chat.  Despite Roosevelt’s assurance during the 
chat that Congress would continue to legislate, the people began to see the 
Roosevelt White House as the chief legislator.  On May 9, The New York Times 
included a selection of congratulatory telegrams sent to the White House from 
men of power–the amount of support, real or exaggerated, for the New Deal was 
astounding.   From Thomas Watson, president of IBM and one of many financial 
leaders of New York in support of the New Deal, to Nassau Country Republicans 
of that same state, who simply insisted “Do not alter your course,” this was a 
program receiving support beyond the common American.166  Over time, 
Americans looked to Roosevelt not only for his charming smile and his infectious 
confidence, but for a plan of recovery.  At times, the power to push forward 
connected to Congress–power the people expected Congress to give Roosevelt, as 
Irving Aronowitz of Brooklyn wrote emphatically: “The people of this nation 
realize the various delicate problems confronting you and are behind you 100%.  
The powers you request from Congress must be granted because you are the right 
man.”167  Such letters display the need Americans have for a plan to be put into 
action, and at times asked specifically for it.  Tyson Pearson from Los Angeles 
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wrote:  “I thank you for your Radio talk of yesterday.  It shed light upon various 
phases of your work and I hope you will, from time to time, when occasion 
demands, use the same means of keeping us “in line”.  It is impossible to get your 
bearings from the press.”168  The fireside chat became an indispensable 
connection between the “people and the president.”  
 More and more, people came to see Roosevelt’s New Deal as a forum for 
legislative experimentation–the system by which their government would attack 
the economic catastrophe.  In this way, the fireside chat became the mode 
Roosevelt would employ to inform the public of his legislative agenda.  This is 
contrary to the historical record: authors first refer to the grammar, syntax, and 
radio voice employed by Roosevelt as the defining features of these speeches, a 
treatment that sells these addresses far short of their intended purpose.  Nor can 
the historical record chalk these speeches up to a way for Roosevelt to instill 
confidence: every word that Roosevelt uttered was filled with confidence, and 
those spoken over the radio were no different.  More importantly, Roosevelt knew 
full well that confidence would not be enough.  There needed to be a revolution in 
governance, and it would mean nothing if it did not reach the people.  The 
message needed a vehicle, a device to carry it across the nation free from criticism 
and disjointed summation in periodicals.   The radio was the mode of 
transportation, and the fireside chat became the course outlined for the 
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administration’s war on depression.  For young Seymour, the grade school student 
looking to Roosevelt for hope, the magical voice of his president was much more 
than a real life Lone Ranger, sweeping in to save the day.  For him, Roosevelt and 
his ideas represented hope for the future entwined within the words “A New Deal 
for the American People.” 
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